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INTRODUCTION
When employers or their managers act against the public
interest, citizen employees are often the first casualties. By "citizen
employees," I mean employees who respond to a sense of public
duty even at some cost to their work, professional relations, or
their employer's business.' Citizen employees are defined by their
conduct. They question or resist instructions to commit or assist
Copyright 2009, by RICHARD R. CARLSON.
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law.
1. Justice Souter has used a similar phrase, "citizen servants," to describe
public employees dedicated to the public interest. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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wrongful activity. When they discover wrongful conduct of fellow
employees or managers, they blow the whistle to other responsible
managers or outside law enforcement authorities. They serve the
public as jurors, witnesses, military reservists, and volunteer
emergency responders, despite the competing demands of their
employment.
Citizen employees can provoke a wide range of responses by
employers and other employees and managers. An employer who
admires service to the public in some contexts might discourage
such activity in other contexts. Fellow employees and managers
may find a citizen employee's conduct commendable, but they
could also find his conduct annoying or even threatening. If a
citizen employee's conduct threatens business or personal interests,
affected managers may brand him incompetent, disloyal,
insubordinate, or antisocial. More importantly, the employer might
retaliate by discharging a citizen employee or by other adverse
employment action to punish the citizen employee and set an
example for others. In this regard, citizen employees resemble
other groups of employees defined in the law by potentially
provocative conduct, including employees who exercise personal
rights under employment statutes or who engage in "concerted
action" to strengthen their bargaining position against an
employer. 2 The defining conduct for each of these protected groups
serves a legislative goal, but the conduct often conflicts with the
interests of employers or individual managers, which is why the
conduct must be protected and employer interference must be
prevented if the conduct is to be promoted. What sets citizen
employees apart from other "protected conduct" groups is the
object of their conduct, which is to further a public interest rather
than personal or collective employee interests.
In the media and in the public imagination, citizen employees
who risk their jobs to protect the public interest or uphold the law
are the heroes of the post-Enron world:3 At first glance, the legal
system shares this view enthusiastically, if enthusiasm is measured
by the number of statutes 4 and court decisions encouraging citizen
2. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
3. Time Magazine named renowned whistleblowers Sherron Watkins,
Cynthia Cooper, and Coleen Rowley the "Persons of the Year" for 2002.
Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The
Whistleblowers, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 30.
4. Looking only at federal laws, and excluding employment laws that
provide anti-retaliation protection in their enforcement provisions, there are at
least nineteen citizen employee protective laws, including the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. See CARLSoN's FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT LAWS ANNOTATED 637 (2008). If one adds enforcement
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employee conduct. Over the last seven years, Congress has enacted
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 5  (SOX), which included new
whistleblower provisions in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009,6 and strengthened other laws7 for the
protection of employees who report violations of federal law or
mismanagement of federal contracts. During the same period, the
Supreme Court addressed six cases important to citizen
employees.8 In three of these cases, a majority of the Court
proclaimed the urgency of protecting employees who uphold the
public interest, particularly in the enforcement of laws against
discrimination. In Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
provisions of federal employment laws like Title VII, which prohibits retaliation
against an employee who has "opposed" unlawful employment practices, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006), the total is somewhere between twenty and thirty,
depending on one's definition of "citizen employee" and one's interpretation of
some federal statutes. For a collection of such employment discrimination
statutes and their anti-retaliation provisions, see CARLSON'S FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT LAWS ANNOTATED 540 (2008)
As for state laws, Texas may be a fair example of what one might find in
most states (and on the whole Texas tends to be quite conservative in the
creation of employee rights). In Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400
(Tex. 1998), the Texas court listed fifteen laws that fit the definition of citizen
employee protective laws, but the list was illustrative, not exhaustive. If Texas is
representative, as I believe it is, there are hundreds of state citizen employee
protective laws.
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C.).
6. American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §
1553, 123 Stat. 115, 296-97.
7. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,
Pub. L No. 110-181, 122 Stat 3, 241-42 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 2409 (2006)).
8. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S. Ct.
846 (2009) (Title VII's "opposition" clause prohibits retaliation against an
employee whose statement to employer's own investigators corroborates another
employee's allegation of harassment); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931
(2008) (statute prohibiting "discrimination on the basis of age" against federal
employees implicitly includes prohibition against retaliation); CBOCS W., Inc. v.
Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008) (Reconstruction Era civil rights law
guaranteeing that all persons shall have the same right "to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens" implicitly includes a prohibition
against retaliation against those who complain of violations of this provision);
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (regarding what
adverse actions violate an explicit anti-retaliation provision in federal employment
discrimination law); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005)
(finding that a federal prohibition against discrimination in education implicitly
prohibits employer retaliation against employees who report such discrimination);
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (First Amendment does not protect
public employees whose speech is pursuant to their official duties).
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White,9 Justice Breyer observed that Title VII's prohibition against
discrimination in employment "depends for its enforcement upon
the cooperation of employees."' 1 In Jackson v. Birmingham Board.
of Education," Justice O'Connor maintained that if Title IX's 12
prohibition against discrimination in education did not implicitly
prohibit retaliation against employee whistleblowers, the law's
enforcement scheme would "unravel" because "individuals who
witness discrimination would likely not report it, . . . and the
underlying discrimination would go unremedied.' 13 In Crawford v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,14
Justice Souter noted that "prudent employees would have a good
reason to keep quiet" 15 about observed violations of Title VII were
it not for that law's prohibition against retaliation.
But episodic expressions of support for citizen employees belie
a persistent ambivalence. The latest developments mark
incremental gains for citizen employees, not a revolution. The
origins of job protection for citizen employees are rooted in an era
long before the Enron scandal. In fact, examples of protective
employment laws for citizen employees date back to the post-Civil
War era.16 Nevertheless, more than a century of incremental gains
has left citizen employees far short of what other protected
employee groups have gained in much shorter stretches of time.
An employer's right to restrict employee behavior as a condition of
employment and to discharge employees at will, even for "good
behavior," remains the default rule.' Narrow exceptions declared
by courts and legislatures for citizen employees cut only a limited
swathe against the employer's freedom to interfere or retaliate.
Moreover, current anti-retaliation laws are of debatable
effectiveness even within the narrow range of their potential effect.
For example, recent scholarship by Professor Richard Moberly
shows that employee claimants rarely succeed in proceedings
9. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
10. Id. at 67 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S.
288 (1960)). In Jackson, the Court adopted a test for what constitutes unlawful
retaliation by an employer. Justice Breyer's majority opinion held that an
employer violates the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII if it takes action that
might dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination. Id. at 66-69.
11. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
12. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 §901, 20 U.S.C. §1681
(2006).
13. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180-81.
14. 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
15. Id. at 848.
16. See infra pp. 20-22.
17. See infra pp. 10-11.
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under SOX, due at least in part to restrictive coverage and
procedural or administrative hurdles.'
8
Narrow coverage is typical of anti-retaliation laws for citizen
employees. Many anti-retaliation laws grant protection only for
certain conduct in support of a particular law, policy, or regulatory
scheme. The implied anti-retaliation rule identified in Jackson, for
example, relates only to an employee's opposition to a violation of
Title IX's prescription against discrimination in education.
19
Express or implied anti-retaliation rules of this sort offer no
protection for employee action in support of laws other than the
ones to which they are attached.2 0 Anti-retaliation laws for a
broader range of laws, policies, or interests are usually limited to
employees of a particular industry, occupation, or unit of21
government, 1 and nearly all anti-retaliation laws limit protection
to particular types of employee conduct. Some anti-retaliation laws
protect an employee only if he engages in whistleblowing by
reporting unlawful activity to an appropriate authority.22 If he
voices his concerns internally to his employer and is discharged
before reporting to an appropriate outside authority, he might be
unprotected. 23 Under other anti-retaliation laws, an employee who
complains to outside authorities might lack protection because he
18. Richard Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of
Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv 65
(2007) [hereinafter Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations].
19. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172-74.
20. See also, e.g., the Energy Reorganization Act, which protects an
employee only if he reports a violation of the Energy Reorganization Act. 42
U.S.C. § 5851 (2006). A whistleblower provision of the Water Pollution Control
Act protects an employee only if he reports a violation of the Water Pollution
Control Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
21. For example, the Texas Whistleblower Act protects only state and local
employees in the state of Texas. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 554.002 (Vernon 2004 &
Supp. 2009). The federal Whistleblower Protection Act protects only employees
of the federal government. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1213-1215 (2006). The anti-retaliation
provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act,
12 U.S.C. § 183 lj (2006), protects only employees of certain types of financial
institutions.
22. A Texas law protects a nurse only if she files a complaint with a
particular regulatory board. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 301.413 (Vernon 2004 &
Supp. 2009). See also Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999)
(interpreting Indiana Occupational Safety Act whistleblower provision); Ball v.
Memphis Bar B Q, 228 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2000) (employee unprotected under
Fair Labor Standards Act retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. §215 (2006), because
he complained of alleged FLSA violations only to his employer and not to the
U.S. Department of Labor).
23. See, e.g., Dep't of Natural Res. v. Heller, 892 A.2d 497 (2006); Austin
v. Healthtrust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1998).
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failed to complain to his supervisors first.24  Encouraging
employees to voice concerns internally first might seem like a
good idea-it might actually prevent wrongdoing from occurring.
But in some states an employee does not qualify as a protected
whistleblower if he objects to "proposed" wrongdoing. He must• 25
blow the whistle only after the wrong is done. Under still another
group of anti-retaliation laws, no variation of whistleblowing is
protected. To gain the protection of the law, an employee must
refuse to obey an order to assist or participate in illegal activity.26
Legal protection can be similarly restrictive for other types of
citizen employees, such as employees who take time from work to
testify in legal proceedings. In many jurisdictions, the question of
whether a witness is protected for missing work time or for
testifying against the employer's interest depends on what law is
being enforced in that proceeding.27 A few states protect
emergency responders who serve the community in case of
disaster;2 the vast majority of states do not.
Citizen employee laws are also mixed with respect to the scope
of employer conduct prohibited. Laws promoting and protecting
24. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2009).
25. Romero v. UHS Westwood Pembroke, Inc., 893 N.E.2d 355 (2008).
26. See, e.g., Bregin v. Liquidebt Sys., 548 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2008)
(interpreting Indiana law); Ed Rachal Found. v. D'Unger, 207 S.W.3d 330 (Tex.
2006) (per curiam).
27. There are many statutes such as Section 15 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act that protect employees who testify in administrative or judicial proceedings
involving the enforcement of a particular law. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2006).
However, most jurisdictions appear to lack any general rule protecting
employees against retaliation or discrimination for taking time off from work to
serve as witnesses, which is why Section 15 is necessary and aids at least those
employees who serve as witnesses in federal wage and hour proceedings.
Compare CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009) (prohibiting
discrimination or retaliation against an employee who takes time off in order to
respond to a subpoena or court order to appear as a witness, evidently applying
to any type of judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding), with HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 378-32 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007) (prohibiting discrimination
against an employee who testifies in a proceeding relating to Hawaii's
employment laws), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.036 (West 2003 & Supp.
2008) (employer must not discriminate against employee who takes time off
from work at a prosecutor's request or in response to a subpoena in certain
criminal proceedings). Statutes such as these seldom distinguish between
discrimination based on the substance of an employee's testimony versus
discrimination based on the loss of working time. Presumably, witness
protection statutes apply to both types of discrimination. See also Reilly v. City
of At. City, 532 F.3d 216 (3rd Cir. 2008) (regarding First Amendment
protection for public employees serving as witnesses).
28. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-IOC-3 (West Supp. 2008) & ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 809 (2007).
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conduct can take a range of approaches toward the employer's
response to the conduct. A typical approach, especially in the case
of judicially declared common law causes of action, is to make the
employer liable for discharging an employee in retaliation for his
protected conduct. 29 A more expansive approach provides
remedies for lesser employment actions, such as harassment. 30 The
most expansive approach is to prohibit employer acts of
interference. 31 Under this approach, an employer violates the law
by threatening employees or otherwise impeding their conduct as
citizens. 32 An employer might be subject to liability or sanctions
under this approach even if its threat was so effective that no
employee acted as a citizen, and it was unnecessary for the
employer to retaliate. Prohibiting employer interference is the most
effective way to promote employee conduct, but very few citizen
employee laws take this approach.
Thus, while the number and variety of laws protecting citizen
employees seems impressive, these laws form an incomplete,
inconsistent, and unreliable patchwork. There is no master anti-
retaliation law of the order of Title VII to fill the gaps, either at the
federal level or in any but a few states. A citizen employee's
protection against retaliation and interference depends as much on
the luck of geography, occupation, and the law the employer
violated as on the merits of the employee's conduct or the value of
his action to the community.
Even after the Supreme Court's most recent interpretations of
express or implied whistleblower protections, there is no assurance
that courts will act to fill gaps left by legislative inaction. A bare
majority of the Court in Jackson favored recognition of implied
whistleblower protection in Title IX, partly because effective
enforcement of the law prohibiting discrimination against students
depends on the vigilance of adult employee watchdogs, 33 but
mainly because protection was implicit in the specific language,
history, and structure of Title IX.34 CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries found implied anti-retaliation protection under Section
29. See, e.g., Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
30. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006) (False Claims Act anti-retaliation
provision).
31. See, e.g., Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (2006), which makes it unlawful for an employer to "interfere" with
employee rights under that Act.
32. Boze v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 04:07CV-74-M, 2009 WL 2485394, at *2-
3 (W.D. Ky. 2009).
33. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2005).
34. Id. at 173-81. See also Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1939
(2008).
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1981 based on stare decisis35 and congressional ratification of an
earlier line of cases.36 Crawford adopted a broad view of the range
of conduct protected by Title VI's "opposition" clause, but the
Court's interpretation of the law could hardly be called
"expansive." To the contrary, the Court's "ordinary meaning"
interpretation of statutory terms was based on a standard dictionary
definition of "oppose."
37
Only in Gomez-Perez v. Potter did the Court issue a precedent
looking beyond the peculiar language and history of a particular
law. In that case the Court held that a statute prohibiting
"discrimination" against employees implicitly prohibits retaliation
against employees who complain about discrimination. 38 However,
nearly every other federal law prohibiting "discrimination" already
includes an express anti-retaliation provision, and the Court's new
rule of construction is useless to a citizen employee supporting a
policy other than a law against "discrimination." Thus, the anti-
retaliation rules discovered in Jackson, CSOCS, Crawford, and
Gomez-Perez are securely tethered to particular statutes. These
decisions do not support a general common law cause of action for
citizen employees who act in support of other public policies.
Nor do these decisions by the Supreme Court necessarily signal
a consistently sympathetic judicial view toward citizen employees.
During the same term in which the Court decided Burlington
Northern, the Court also issued Garcetti v. Ceballos,39 restricting
First Amendment protection for whistleblowing public
employees.4 ° Prior to Garcetti the First Amendment had served as
an important source of protection for whistleblowing state and
local government employees not otherwise covered by effective
civil service or whistleblower statutes. In Garcetti, however, the
Court held that the First Amendment provides no protection for a
public employee's speech "pursuant to the employee's official
duties." 4' Among other things, the Court worried that extending
First Amendment protection to speech pursuant to official duties
35. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2008) ("our
conclusion rests in significant part on stare decisis").
36. The Court recalled Section 1981's convoluted history of judicial
interpretation and congressional response, culminating in amendments in 1991
that validated a line of court decisions suggesting that Section 1981 implicitly
prohibited retaliation. Id. at 1955-58.
37. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S. Ct.
846, 850 (2009).
38. Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1931.





would lead to "permanent" and "intrusive" judicial oversight of
employee communications in the course of official business.42 In
this regard, the Court's decision echoed arguments frequently
espoused by employers, who complain that anti-retaliation
protection empowers employees to oppose legitimate managerial
directives, appeal managerial issues to judicial review, or frustrate
anticipated disciplinary action by false claims of protected
conduct.
Fear of undermining management is a major obstacle to a more
coherent and effective law for citizen employees. Another obstacle
is uncertainty about whether generic definitions of public policy,
protected employee conduct, or prohibited employer action are
possible. At first glance, both concerns look familiar. They
resemble arguments routinely asserted in opposition to nearly any
new exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. However, legal
protection for citizen employees presents unique challenges and
risks to employers, lawmakers, and courts. It is much more
difficult to define conduct deserving protection than it is to define
protected traits like race or gender. Defining gender or race is a
fairly straightforward and objective matter, involving only a few
possible classifications and raising few issues of legitimate
employer interests. In contrast, there are infinite forms of
employee conduct, and the value of conduct depends on its context
and its goal. Defining "public policy" or "public interest" goals for
citizen employees is laden with value judgments, and an open-
ended definition may invite action that intrudes on an employer's
reasonable business interests and expectations. Defining methods
of employee conduct involves another set of value judgments
about the reasonableness of employee behavior as compared to an
employer's interest in scheduling, directing, and managing work.
This Article proposes a reset for the law of citizen employees,
with a goal of achieving a more expansive and adaptive law that
recognizes the respective interests of the public, the employer, and
employees. Achieving these goals involves two major components.
First, lawmakers should recognize citizen employees as a discrete
class that should be treated under a separate set of rules. Second,
lawmakers should grant courts a mandate similar to Title VII but
designed to allow the development of a separate common law for
citizen employees. The mandate should allow for protection of a
broad range of employee conduct in support of public policy
according to principles of reasonableness that balance public,
employer, and employee interests. The mandate should also allow
42. Id. at 423.
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for a broad range of public policies that might be the purpose of a
citizen employee's protected conduct.
This Article begins in Part I with an examination of the citizen
employee's dilemma: following his sense of civic duty may lead to
conflict with his employer, who reserves the right to discharge the
employee in the absence of anti-retaliation law. Part II describes
how legal protection for citizen employees has evolved over the
past century, ending in its current chaotic and incomplete state.
Finally, Part III describes the challenges lawmakers face in
drafting better citizen employee law. These challenges include
widely expressed objections to the idea of creating new rights for
employees. Therefore, Subpart A of Part III describes the principle
objections, answers and rejects some of these objections, and
offers solutions to the others. Subpart B addresses the other
challenge: defining limits to citizen employee conduct. First,
Subpart B considers the problem of defining protected conduct.
Second, it addresses the problem of defining public policy. The
solution to these problems is a legislative mandate stated in broad
terms and authorizing courts to develop more detailed rules on a
case-by-case basis. However, Part III's discussion of the problem
of defining protected conduct and public policy includes a number
of recommendations for courts as they develop these concepts for a
more effective citizen employee law.
I. THE CITIZEN EMPLOYEE'S DILEMMA: Civic DuTY AND
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
Laws prohibiting employer retaliation or interference with
certain employee conduct are exceptions to a broad principle of
freedom for terminating employment relations. In the absence of
contract or statutory protection, the default rule for employment
relations nearly everywhere in the United States is that either party
may end the relationship "at will"-for a good reason, bad reason,
or no reason at all, as long as the employer is not motivated by
prohibited discrimination or other illegal intent.43 A corollary is
that either party-as a practical matter mainly the employer-can
use its right of termination to impose conditions on continuation of
the relationship.
The presumption that employment is at will has prevailed since
at least the late nineteenth century,44 and it remains well-
43. See RICHARD CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW 684-88 (2d ed. 2009)
[hereinafter CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW].
44. HORACE GAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT
§ 134, at 272 (Albany, N.Y., J.D. Parsons, Jr. 1877).
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entrenched, though subject to exceptions for some discriminatory
and retaliatory motives prohibited by law.45 Employment-at-will
serves important and legitimate purposes for both parties. For the
employer, the right to terminate permits changes in the size and
composition of the workforce depending on the state of the market,
the direction of the business, the effect of new technology, or the
results of reorganization or consolidation.46 The right to terminate
also bolsters an employer's authority in the management of the
business. Employees are more likely to follow the employer's
instructions if the employer retains the right to discharge as a
disciplinary measure.47 The employer's authority is strongest if the
employee cannot appeal the employer's decision to a judge, jury,
or arbitrator.48 The employer's power to change conditions or
impose new conditions of employment at any time makes the
employer's authority even stronger. An employer can select at will
from among his current employees for promotion or special
privileges, and instead of terminating an employee he can
administer lesser discipline at will.49 Lesser discipline might be
formal, such as a demotion or transfer to an undesirable
assignment, or it might simply be the end of the employee's
progression up the corporate ladder.
45. See, e.g., Walker v. AT&T Tech., 995 F.2d 846, 849 (8th Cir. 1993);
Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1444 (7th Cir. 1992). See
generally CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 43, at 684-88. Montana is
the only state that has enacted a statute abrogating the employment-at-will
doctrine. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1) (2007).
Some employees, particularly in the public or collective bargaining sectors,
enjoy varying measures of protection against discharge at will. Collective
bargaining agreements typically require just cause for discharge, and many
public employees are protected by administrative civil services schemes. See,
e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7543 (2006), establishing a Merit Systems Protection
Board to hear federal employee challenges to disciplinary discharges and other
adverse actions. However, as of 2003 only eight point two percent of private
sector employees were union members. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS IN 2003, http://www.bls.gov/pub/
news.release/union2 01212004.txt. Public sector employees constitute about
sixteen point one percent of the workforce. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
Industry at a Glance: Government, http://www.bls.gov/iag/govemment.htm (last
visited on Oct. 23, 2006).
46. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983)
(employment-at-will serves the employer's need for "sufficient flexibility to
make needed personnel decisions in order to adapt to changing economic
conditions"); James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of
Deterrence, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 91, 98 (1989).
47. Hubbell, supra note 46, at 99-100; Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of
the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 957 (1984).
48. Hubbell, supra note 46, at 98-99.
49. CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 43, at 21, 254-55, 525-26.
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The employer's right to discharge is an especially powerful
motivational tool because the consequences of involuntary
termination can be so severe for an employee and his dependents.
It is also reason enough for an employee to avoid challenging the
employer even when the employer acts foolishly, arbitrarily, or
illegally.5° However, lesser forms of retaliation can also be very
effective to motivate an employee. Most employees work hard to
please their employers, not only to avoid maximum discipline but
also to avoid the loss of privileges and benefits and to assure
continued advancement in their careers. An ambitious employee
may follow instructions to which he silently objects simply to
remain in favor with the managers who control his economic
destiny.
As long as an employer and its managers manipulate the levers
of control for lawful business aims, an employee's objections to
his employer's goals, business strategy, and methods are a private
matter between them. The public has no more than an indirect
interest in whether the employer exercises good judgment or
beneficence in directing, rewarding, disciplining, or terminating
employees. Admittedly, an employee's involuntary discharge can
cause great suffering for the employee and his dependents, and
there may be associated social ills for the public. 51 However, it is
not the purpose of this Article to question employment-at-will as a
general principle. This Article's focus is on the public's direct
interest in preventing an employer or some of its managers from
exercising discretion over personnel matters to achieve objectives
that are illegal or contrary to identifiable public policy or public
interest.
The motivational power of employment-at-will poses a direct
threat to the public when an employer or manager uses the power
to accomplish objectives that are illegal or disproportionately
harmful to the public. It is one thing to threaten disciplinary action
to motivate an employee to work or to abide by the employer's
lawful business practices, whether wise or misguided; it is another
to rely on the threat of discipline to overcome an employee's sense
of moral or civic duty and to force his participation or
acquiescence in illegal or disproportionately harmful practices. In
the latter case, the usual economic arguments in favor of
employment-at-will might be outweighed by a larger public
interest.
50. See Kyung M. Song, Out of Work and Feeling the Pain, SEATTLE





The public's stake in an employer's disciplinary threats or
actions is clearest when an employer compels an employee to
participate in or condone activity the state has clearly declared
unlawful. In this case, the employer's express or implicit threat of
discipline facilitates the employer's offense. Indeed, business
crime is often impossible without the complicity of many
employees. At the very least, an employer or manager scofflaw
needs employees to look the other way. As the Supreme Court
noted in Jackson, employees are the most likely witnesses of an
employer's violation of the law.52 Employees in the financial
sector have been important in revealing a great deal of managerial
fraud in recent years, 53 and public sector employees have saved
billions in public revenue54 and prevented untold injuries and
fatalities by aiding in the discovery of corruption and
mismanagement in government agencies and by government
contractors. Even when employees are not the first to bring
employer misconduct to light, their help may be essential to
investigators and prosecutors. Employees are frequently the only
persons with first hand knowledge of a manager's action, method,
and intent in breaking the law.
Enforcement of criminal and civil law is the most obvious
reason for the public's interest in restricting an employer's
freedom to manage its workforce, but the public interest can
include more than law enforcement. It can also include basic
values of democracy and participatory government. An employer
might interfere with these civic values in at least two different
ways. First, an employer's immoderate regulation of speech, self-
expression, lifestyle, and off-duty conduct can diminish an
52. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2005). See
also Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental
Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE
L.J. 1619, 1641-42 (2004) (regarding the tendency of firms to conceal
information about the nature and extent of the environmental hazards of their
businesses).
53. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to
Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1117-19
(2006) [hereinafter Moberly, Structural Model]; Douglas M. Branson, Too Many
Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate Governance in the Post-Enron, Post
WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REv. 65, 78-79 (2006).
54. Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False
Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 355, 355-57 (1991).
55. See, e.g., John Crawly, Watchdog Says FAA, Southwest Ties Too Close,
REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2008 (describing the role of employee whistleblowers within
the Federal Aviation Administration and private airline companies in revealing
the FAA's badly compromised oversight of airline maintenance); Shameful
Silence/Failure to Protect Teenage Inmates from Staff Sexual Abuse Demands
Texas Youth Commission Shake-Up, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 2, 2007, at B10.
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employee's ability to participate in a free and democratic society.
Of course, an employer might have solid business reasons for
regulating employee speech and behavior, and an employee's loss
of some individual freedom is usually not disproportionately
harmful to the public interest, even if it is annoying or even hurtful
to the employee. For example, a tobacco company's requirement
that employees exhibit a tolerant attitude toward smoking would
bear a logical relationship to the company's business and would
not likely threaten the vitality of democratic or participatory
government. However, history includes many examples of social
and civic regulation by employers on such a scale as to pose a real
threat to democratic institutions, particularly at a local level where
an employer might enjoy concentrated influence. The best and
most obvious examples are the "company towns" that once56
flourished at the peak of the Industrial Revolution. Even without
that sort of community influence, employers might interfere with
elections and judicial proceedings by threatening employees about
their decisions as voters or their testimony as witnesses.
57
A second way an employer can interfere with democratic and
participatory government is by the way it manages its employees'
time. Employers compete with public institutions for an
employee's finite time and energy, and an employer's
uncompromising demands for devotion to scheduled job duties
may deprive the public of its own needs. Government depends on
employees of other enterprises to serve as voters, jurors, witnesses,
emergency responders, and community volunteers. An employee's
public service often requires time and energy at the expense of his
56. William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and Law in
the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 767, 796 (1985) (describing the company
town system in which "the corporation often owned everything from church and
school to houses and stores"); Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American
Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 250-54 (1996) (describing
employer efforts to exercise control over employee lifestyle during the early
twentieth century, including matters of marital life, personal hygiene, attendance
at approved churches, and of course union membership); Ariela J. Gross, "The
Caucasian Cloak": Mexican Americans and the Politics of Whiteness in the
Twentieth-Century Southwest, 95 GEO. L.J. 337, 356 (2007) (describing
agricultural communities in the Southwest resembling "company towns"). See
also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946) (noting the large number
of workers in the bituminous coal industry working in company towns at that
time and invoking the First Amendment to prevent an employer-owner of a
company town from restricting free speech on the town's sidewalks).
57. See, e.g., Reilly v. City of At. City, 532 F.3d 216 (3rd Cir. 2008)
(public employer allegedly retaliated against employee based on the content of
his testimony as a witnesses). The First Amendment may protect public




regular job, particularly if public service is scheduled during the
employee's normal work hours. The conflict can be particularly
severe with respect to jury service, which can require an
employee's absence from work for days, weeks, or even months.
58
Not surprisingly, some employers urge their employees to avoid
jury or other public service, and they discharge employees who
miss work for public service, either as a matter of discipline or to
make room for a replacement to perform work the employer
believes is necessary and cannot be delayed. 59
An employer's freedom to discipline employees for obeying
civic duties or upholding the law or the public interest is not
without practical limits. There are good reasons even for a cynical
employer to act responsibly in managing employees. Supporting
the local community will likely enhance the enterprise's
reputation. It might be in the employer's interest if employees vote
and serve as jurors because employees might share the employer's
interests better than nonemployees. Encouraging employees to
report renegade managers may prevent misappropriation, criminal
liability, or civil liability. Disciplining, discharging, or mistreating
employees for being good citizens may hurt workforce morale and
productivity, even if it is an employer's right.60 Firing an employee
for retaliatory reasons can also cause litigation expense, even when
discharge is lawful, because the employee might still sue-based
on alleged unlawful age, gender, disability, race, or other
discrimination, instead of lawful retaliation. 6 1 The employer might
actually lose such a lawsuit because its true retaliatory but
nondiscriminatory motive is too embarrassing to admit or because
a sympathetic fact finder will find room to substitute the illegal
motive for the lawful retaliatory one.62 If the employer wins, it
58. According to one recent survey of employers, more than half of
responding employers complained that employee jury service disrupted
production and caused other hardship. Employers Nationwide Polled on Jury
Service, NEW YORK STATE JURY POOL NEWS, Fall 2005, at 4, available at http://
www.nyjuror.gov/general-information/jpn-pdfs/j pnfall05.pdf.
59. See, e.g., In re Bregar, 485 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Ill. 2007); S.C. Toof
& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).
60. At a minimum, these costs include searching for and training a
replacement, the effect of termination on morale of the remaining workforce,
and the effect on the employer's unemployment compensation experience rating.
61. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006) (prohibiting age discrimination); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color,
national origin, sex and religion); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability).
62. Even if the employer's motive is not one of the specifically prohibited
motives, nearly any involuntary discharge can lead to a charge of unlawful
discrimination. If so, the employer will be compelled to "articulate" its motive.
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might still face embarrassment and liability stemming from
evidence of the wrongdoing that was the real nondiscriminatory
cause of the employee's discharge. Finally, an employer's right to
retaliate and its explicit or implicit threat to do so are not always
sufficient to discourage a determined citizen employee. Some
employees simply have a very strong sense of conscience, are
outraged by particularly bad conduct, have already left the
employer, or otherwise have little left to lose by opposing the
employer.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that employers do
interfere and retaliate and that the lack of effective legal protection
deters some would-be citizen employees and facilitates significant
corporate crime and abuse of public interests. The threat of
retaliation may be implicit in any employment relationship,
whether or not the employer takes any particular steps to make this
threat clear. Most employees probably understand that questioning
a manager's instructions or conduct on moral, legal, or civic duty
grounds is likely to be received as a personal offense and will
affect their personal relationship with the manager. That lesson
might be learned even when the manager's conduct is not in fact
illegal. A manager can still be offended by an employee's
questions even if these questions lead to nothing sinister.
Furthermore, whatever a firm's long-term best interest,
individual managers or groups of managers sometimes act for
selfish or short-term interests and use their authority over fellow
employees to accomplish their goals. 63 Wrongful or unlawful
behavior is a slippery slope. One misdeed tends to follow another,
particularly if the first was successful and rewarding. If an
irresponsible manager serves as a leader for other employees, or if
he seems to condone bad behavior, the firm may become infused
with a culture of wrongdoing. Eventually, a firm's long-term best
interests might be outweighed by the danger of embarrassment or
liability for what has already happened. Even if higher
management was not complicit at the outset, they may believe their
personal interests and the interests of the firm are best served by a
cover-up. Managers who participated in misdeeds or aided in a
Burdine v. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). If the employer's
motive was "nondiscriminatory" but otherwise socially offensive, it may be
reluctant to reveal its motive in a public hearing. A judge, jury, or government
agency might regard the employer's difficulty in explaining a challenged action
as evidence of an illegal motive. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502 (1993).
63. See Larry Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 279, 285 (2004).
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cover-up will have a personal stake in preventing other employees
from resisting or reporting the misdeeds. If an employee endangers
the success or secrecy of unlawful activity, the usual reasons for
caution in discharging employees will not count for much. Fear,
embarrassment, a sense of personal betrayal, and the instinct for
revenge will count more.
A number of surveys of workplace behavior and records of
corporate scandal confirm the reality and effectiveness of
management efforts to suppress citizen employee conduct.
Managers frequently favor personal or corporate interests over
public interests even when the stakes are relatively small. For
example, supervisors often act to discourage employees from jury
service, which might cause temporary inconvenience but does not
threaten a manger or the employer with substantial liability or
embarrassment. The implicit or explicit threat of retaliation is
more intense when the stakes are high, such as when the employer
or one of its managers is engaging in criminal or tortious behavior.
In many reported corporate scandals, one or more employees may
have eventually acted to stop corruption, but the record reveals that
a much greater number remained silent and that corruption
persisted over long periods with great harm to the public before a
few employees finally brought the scheme to an end.65 In some
cases, employee whistleblowers did not step forward until business
failure or other events had already exposed at least part of the
illegal activity.
In the case of Enron, for instance, it is clear in retrospect that
many employees were aware of widespread misreporting of the
company's finances for years before the company's meltdown. In
fact, the company's financial misreporting was a frequent inside
joke among employees at company parties.67 At Stanford Bank,
which stands accused of an $8 billion fraud against investors,
managers are reported to have threatened other personnel with
discharge if they asked questions about details of the Bank's
64. See Robert Walters & Michael Main, Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled
Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 331 (2005) (reporting that people
earning less than $35,000 annually were especially likely to experience action
by their employers to discourage them from jury service).
65. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 53, at 1120; James Fanto,
Whistleblowing and the Public Director. Countering Corporate Inner Circles,
83 OR. L. REV. 435, 460 (2004).
66. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 53, at 1108; ROBERT BRYCE,
PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 246-47 (2003).
67. Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 53, at 1120; BETHANY MCLEAN
& PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND
SCANDALOUs FALL OF ENRON 296 (2003).
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alleged investments. Intimidation evidently succeeded.68 Deeply
suspicious personnel were deterred from pursuing the matter, and
the Bank's problems remained unreported and uninvestigated for at
least another six years.69 At the Peanut Corporation of America's
Georgia facility, dangerously unsanitary conditions were widely
known to employees, but these conditions persisted for years and
remained unreported to authorities until salmonella poisoning
sickened hundreds of consumers.70 The tobacco industry's
prolonged deception about the safety and addictiveness of
cigarettes endured for decades with the knowledge of many
employees. Not until 1994 did two whistleblowers reveal the
industry's misrepresentation of data and manipulation of addictive
ingredients that began thirty years earlier.71 Massive fraud in the
savings and loan association sector in the 1980s could not have
occurred without the tacit approval of many employees, but the
fraud came to light mainly because of the virtual collapse of the
industry, not because of employee whistleblowing. 72 As today's
unfolding financial crisis reveals fraud of unprecedented scale in
the mortgage and financial investment industries, one is left to
wonder how many employees were sufficiently aware of financial
impropriety that they might have complained more loudly and
effectively.
Many employees are not only silent, but they affirmatively
assist wrongdoing. Indeed, many illegal schemes cannot succeed
without the participation of employees who share responsibility for
or control over assets, documents, and data. Illicit activity by a
business or its managers often depends on many hands to prepare
or sign false documents, mislead auditors and inspectors,
misappropriate public or private corporate resources, release toxic
waste, or finish the design, manufacture, and marketing of a
defective product.
At Enron and HealthSouth, for example, corporate executives
depended on subordinates to assist in the misrepresentation of data
that was the basis for highly inflated earnings figures over several
68. Daniel Wagner & Rasha Madkour, Questioning Stanford's Returns
Could Get You Fired, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 20, 2009.
69. Id.
70. Dahleen Glanton, Ex-Employees Tell of Filthy Conditions at Georgia
Peanut Processing Plant, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/feb/05/nation/na-peanut5.
71. Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and
the Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REv. 311, 324-25 (1998).
72. Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen:




years.73 At A.H. Robins Co., managers seeking to conceal evidence
of the company's prior knowledge of a defect in the Dalkon Shield
relied on the help of subordinates to collect and destroy
incriminating documents.74 An executive at the Spirol Company
concealed unlawful pollution of local waterways by encouraging
employees to tamper with the water monitoring process by diluting
or filtering water samples. 75 Eli Lilly's success in marketing the
drug Zyprexa depended in part on the willingness of sales
personnel to conceal the drug's disturbing side effects.76 The
company eventually paid over $1 billion to settle claims by
patients to whom doctors had prescribed the drug.77 Workers at the
Peanut Corporation of America may have contributed to the 2008
outbreak of salmonella poisoning by placing new date stickers on
expired product.7 8
Some employees who aid or condone conduct against the
public interest might do so regardless of legal protection against
retaliation. Some may have a weak sense of civic duty or respect
for the law, just like the managers or co-employees who direct the
unlawful conduct. Others may feel a sense of loyalty to their
employer, supervisors, or fellow employees that is stronger than
their sense of responsibility to the public. Still others may be
motivated by ambition and a desire to succeed in the organization,
or by the rationalization that some misconduct is necessary to
assure the ultimate success of the enterprise on which their
aspirations depend. Colleagues can reinforce such tendencies in
each other so that low regard for the public interest becomes part
of the workplace culture. Still, the possibility that just one
employee will oppose misconduct, particularly criminal conduct,
ought to be very inhibiting to managerial scofflaws, unless
managers are very confident of employee loyalty or of their control
over subordinates. The power to determine an employee's future
within the organization is an important aspect of such managerial
control. At the very least, it fortifies a manager's confidence in his
control and raises the price of conscience for would-be citizen
employees.
73. Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 53, at 1119-20.
74. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1223-24 (Kan. 1987)
(affirming an award of punitive damages against the company).
75. United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 535-36 (2d Cir. 1995).
76. Alex Berenson, Ely Lilly Said to Play Down Risk of Top Pill, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, § 1, at 1.
77. Alex Berenson, Lilly Settles with 18,000 Over Zyprexa, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2007, at C 1.
78. Glanton, supra note 70.
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Granting employees a legal remedy for retaliation tips the
balance more favorably toward the public interest. Admittedly, the
opportunity to oppose, sue, and provoke an employer is not likely
to appeal to many employees who are otherwise secure in their
jobs and careers or who feel personal loyalty to management,
fellow employees, or the firm.79 While existing anti-retaliation
laws certainly have led to claims by alleged citizen employees, the
claimants might have acted as citizen employees regardless of
legal remedies, or they might be disgruntled employees fired for
perfectly legitimate reasons. However, a legal remedy for
retaliation likely has at least three important effects. First, it
increases the possibility that at least one employee will oppose an
employer's misconduct, and one employee might be just enough to
deter or reveal the misconduct. Second, awareness of the remedy
makes an employer more cautious, particularly in complying with
the law and the public interest. Third, a demonstration of the
remedy, even by a "disgruntled" employee discharged for
legitimate reasons, can shock actual or potential wrongdoers, and it
can be an antidote for a culture of wrongdoing.
II. THE EVOLVING LAW FOR CITIZEN EMPLOYEES
A. Early Efforts to Protect Citizen Employees
There are at least three different accounts of the emergence,
decline, and persistence of the employment-at-will doctrine. One
account examines the doctrine's emergence and validity as a rule
of contract and compares it with theories of implied promise of job
security or of good faith and fair dealing.80 Another concems the
enactment of a series of statutory prohibitions against status-based
discrimination beginning mainly with the Civil Rights Act of
1964.81 The third account, which is set forth below, highlights
legislative and judicial intervention in employment relations when
79. There are some laws that sweeten the rewards for whistleblowers by
providing bounties for successful whistleblowing. See, e.g., the False Claims
Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006).
80. See, e.g., Lawrence Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom.
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404
(1967); Andrew Moriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic
Reassessment of the Rise of Employment at Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 (1994);
Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite
Employment Contracts in the United States and England: An Historical
Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 85 (1982).
81. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006)).
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an employer seeks to control employee behavior in ways inimical
to the public interest. Naturally, all of these developments are
interrelated, in some ways supporting each other and in other ways
conflicting with each other.
The idea of protecting employees as a way of protecting the
public's own interests, apart from the contractual or other personal
rights of the parties, is not new. Indeed, for as long as courts have
recognized employment-at-will as a doctrine of law, judges and
other observers of employment law have worried over the
unsettling prospect that an employer or individual managers could
use their power over employees not only for legitimate business
purposes, but also to control employees in ways contrary to the
public interest. In fact, protection of public interests was among the
earliest grounds for legislative or judicial intrusion on the
employer's managerial freedom.
The public's direct stake in an employer's management of its
workforce has been most obvious when the public is the
employer.8 2 Not surprisingly, the earliest American reforms
limiting managerial discretion to select and dismiss employees
applied to employees of agencies and departments of the United
States government. Prior to the 1880s, federal employment was
dominated by the "spoils" system, in which employment at nearly
every level depended on political affiliation and loyalty. 3 Early
advocates for reform of federal employment concentrated their
efforts on the creation of a system of nonpartisan, merit-based
selection of employees, believing that regulation of employee
selection would lead naturally to an end to partisanship and
corruption in other aspects of employment, including discipline
and termination.84 In 1877, the same year as the publication of
Horace Wood's famous statement of the employment-at-will
doctrine, 85 President Rutherford Hayes issued an executive order
82. During the late nineteenth century, for example, the federal government
and many state governments treated public employment as a means for
providing for the welfare of veterans. U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
Vet Guide Appendix D: A Brief History of Veterans Preference,
http://www.opm.gov/veterans/html/vghist.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). After
the Civil War, they enacted laws that assured veterans a unique special right to
public employment unless and until they gave good cause for discharge. See,
e.g., State v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, 44 A. 963 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1899).
83. 1 DUMAs MALONE & BASIL RAUCH, EMPIRE FOR LIBERTY 444 (1960).
84. Developments in the Law--Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REv.
1619, 1629-30 (1984).
85. WOOD, supra note 44, § 136 ("With us, the rule is inflexible that a
general or indefinite hiring is, prima facie, a hiring at will . ").
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requiring appointment of federal employees based on merit rather
than political affiliation.
86
The reformers hoped that merit selection would result in more
rational, selfless management of the public's workforce and that
legal intervention against arbitrary or corrupt termination of public
employees would become unnecessary. The reformers were soon
disappointed to find that merit selection was no inoculation against
arbitrary and politically motivated personnel actions against
incumbent employees. Thus, twenty years after President Hayes'
first step toward a modem civil service, President William
McKinley expanded protection for federal civil servants. By
executive order in 1897, McKinley required that "no removal shall
be made from any position subject to comprehensive examination
except for just cause and upon written charges." 87 Owing to the
lack of protection against lesser personnel actions and the absence
of judicial review or enforcement,8 8 McKinley's order was flimsy
protection for most federal employees. However, it seeded the
development of further federal civil service reforms that continued
over the next century, culminating in the Civil Service Reform Act
of 197889 and the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.90
86. Public Employment, supra note 84, at 1629-30; 2 MALONE & RAUCH,
supra note 83, at 130. Congressional endorsement of a limited merit system of
appointments arrived with the Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403
(restricting discharge of federal employees only when motivated by failure to
contribute money or services to a political party).
Prior to President Hayes' order, there was one other federal law that
superficially protected political appointees from arbitrary discharge. The Tenure
of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), barred the President from acting
without the Senate's consent in removing officials whose appointment was with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The Act was Congress' effort to weaken
President Andrew Johnson in political battles over the progress of the post-Civil
War Reconstruction. Ironically, it stood as an impediment to President Hayes'
efforts to appoint officials dedicated to a true civil service. Congress repealed
the Tenure of Office Act in 1887. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500. See
2 MALONE & RAUCH, supra note 83, at 14, 17-19, 130-31, 136. See also Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
87. Exec. Order No. 101 (1897); Public Employment, supra note 84, at
1630-31. Congress endorsed administrative protection against arbitrary
discharge of federal employees in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, ch. 389, §
6, 37 Stat. 539, 555.
88. See United States ex rel. Taylor v. Taft, 203 U.S. 461, 464-65 (1906).
But see Lellmann v. United States, 37 Ct. Cl. 128 (1902) (upholding right of
wrongfully discharged civil service employee to recover back pay after
administrative order of reinstatement).
89. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-2305 (2006)).
90. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 32
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1219, 1221, 1222, 3352 (2006)).
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State and local government employees were another matter. A
few states and cities were quick to follow the example of the
federal government in providing substantial protection for their
civil servants. 91 The greater number of state and local government
employees remained several steps behind their federal
counterparts, at least in terms of coverage under civil service
laws.92 Nevertheless, to the extent a requirement of "just cause" for
discharge is effective in preventing badly motivated personnel
action, civil service reforms have tempered the urgency of anti-
retaliation protection in public sector employment. For state and
local government employees without such protection, the First
Amendment eventually became an important alternative refuge.
93
Protection for private sector employees proceeded more slowly
at first, and usually along a separate track. The public's stake in
private employment is less obvious than its stake in public
employment because private sector employees do not serve the
public in the ordinary course of their work. Moreover, legislators
and judges have bowed more willingly to a private sector
employer's discretion to manage its workforce without second-
guessing by a judge or jury.94 On the other hand, when a private
sector citizen employee seeks inventive relief in a court, he enjoys
an important advantage over his public sector counterpart: the lack
of a sovereign immunity defense for the employer. 95 Thus, to the
extent courts have asserted a right to mold a common law of
employment, they have done so with greater leeway for private
91. See, e.g., People ex rel. Brant v. MacLean, 11 N.Y.S. 559 (1890)
(describing and interpreting a law of the city of New York, requiring notice of
proposed reason for discharge and an opportunity to answer); People ex rel.
Campbell v. Hannan, 10 N.Y.S. 71 (1890) (describing a civil service law of the
city of Troy, New York).
92. See Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharge from Employment: A
Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1979).
93. See Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391
U.S. 563 (1968). However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Garcetti
limited First Amendment protection for state and local government employees
by denying protection for speech pursuant to official duties. See supra p. 8 and
infra p. 63; Paul Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?,
79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1101 (2008).
94. When courts dismiss employee claims they find to be without merit,
they frequently add that employee protective laws do not authorize employees,
juries, or judges to substitute their business judgment for that of the employer.
See, e.g., Chapman v. Al Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
95. See, e.g., Midland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Watley, 216 S.W.3d 374 (Tex.
App. 2006); Magnetti v. Univ. of Md., 909 A.2d 1101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2006); Ball v. Ark. Dep't of Cmty. Punishment, 10 S.W.3d 873 (Ark. 2000);
Messiha v. State, 583 N.W.2d 385, 390 (N.D. 1998); MacDonald v. Univ. of
N.C. at Chapel Hill, 263 S.E.2d 578 (N.C. 1980).
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sector employees than for public sector employees. 96 In many
jurisdictions, courts wielding the power to declare and refine the
common law have been important alternative sources of
lawmaking for private sector citizen employees.
As was true in the case of the public sector, legislative and
judicial intervention in the private sector was initially motivated by
concern for democratic government. One of the earliest threats
recognized by lawmakers was that private sector employers would
use their power over employees to affect the outcome of elections,
either by coercing employees to vote for particular candidates or
propositions, or by preventing employees from voting at all. Not
surprisingly, statutes assuring employees the right to vote were
among the first modem laws effectively limiting the employment-
at-will doctrine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. 97  However, voting rights legislation sometimes
approached the problem as one of employer interference rather
than retaliatory dismissal. It might have seemed to a nineteenth-
century legislator that an employee's opportunity to vote is
blocked as much or more by the employer's right to schedule as by
its right to discharge, even if one right sprang from the other.
Moreover, an employer can prevent employee voting without
intending to do so. An employer might simply be unwilling to
sacrifice working time. Thus, a solution required the removal of a
barrier. In some voting rights statutes, employers were required to
grant time off from work on election day to assure that employees
had an opportunity to vote.
98
Another early threat addressed by the courts concerned the
disproportionate power some private sector employers exercised
over social, economic, and political life within particular
communities. During the early and middle stages of the Industrial
Revolution, many towns grew up around single factories, mines, or
96. The First Amendment has sometimes supplied judicial authority,
comparable to judicial authority to declare and refine the common law, for
purposes of creative judicial remedies for public sector employees. However, the
Supreme Court's Garcetti decision significantly diminished the usefulness of the
First Amendment as a source of protection in the public sector workplace. See
supra p. 8 and infra p. 63.
97. See, e.g., Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 217 N.W. 412 (Wis. 1928) (upholding
the criminal conviction of an employer for threatening employees to vote in favor
of a particular proposition); People v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 138 N.E. 155
(I11. 1923) (upholding the constitutionality of part of an 1891 Illinois election law
requiring employers to provide time off from work to vote; but holding
unconstitutional another part that required an employer to compensate the
employee for such time). See also MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West
2007) (showing origin of election law protecting employees in 1852).
98. See supra note 97.
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terminuses that became the dominant employer for the local
workforce. 99 These concentrations of economic power in local
communities stoked fears that employers might use their power to
overwhelm democratic institutions and personal liberties.'°° There
were many ways an employer could make its power felt in a
community. One method was the employer-directed boycott by
workers against other businesses, organizations, or individuals who
opposed or challenged the employer. For example, an employer
supporting its own "company store" might direct a boycott against
a competing merchant in order to drive the competitor from the
market.
Such employer boycott cases did not involve interference with
or retaliation against an employee's conduct in the public interest.
Shopping at one store rather than another is not a public duty, nor
is it a necessary part of democratic governance. Nevertheless, the
boycott cases were important in sensitizing courts to a darker side
of the employment-at-will doctrine and to the risk to public
interests. The initial judicial response to employer boycotts was
mixed. Until the enactment of antitrust and unfair trade practice
statutes late in the nineteenth century, it was unclear whether such
a boycott was unlawful even if it was clearly against the public
interest in free and fair trade. 101 Moreover, if anyone was entitled
to a remedy it was the injured merchant, not the employee who lost
his freedom to choose or who lost his job for violating the boycott.
Even the injured merchant, however, had no guaranteed remedy
when the employer asserted employment-at-will as a defense for
its enforcement of the boycott.
99. See supra p. 14.
100. See infra p. 26.
101. The idea that organizing workers into a boycott might be against the
public interest actually began to mature in a different kind of setting: a union's
boycott or other organized action against an employer. For much of the
nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, judges sometimes
upheld civil conspiracy claims and even criminal charges against labor unions
for organizing employees to interfere with the free market. Some judges targeted
even peaceful picketing and other strike activity by labor unions on general
public policy grounds, for threatening the public interest by seeking to interfere
with the employment of nonmembers, or by attempting to manipulate the labor
market. Richard R. Carlson, The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representation
in American Labor Law, 30 DUQ. L. REv. 779, 791-803 (1992). However, until
the enactment of antitrust and unfair trade statutes in the late nineteenth century,
there was no consensus about the circumstances under which a boycott




The first reported case challenging an employer-directed
boycott was Payne v. Western & Atlantic R. Co. 0 2 The plaintiff in
Payne was a merchant who owned a store near the railroad's depot.
According to his allegations, he had built up a considerable
business by "honest and fair dealing" with the railroad's
employees, passengers, and other persons living along the
railroad's line. 103 Payne further alleged that the railroad had sought
to destroy his business by circulating a written notice that "[a]ny
employee of this company. .. who trades with L. Payne from this
date will be discharged."' 0 4 Payne contended that the railroad's
exercise of its power as an employer to enforce this boycott
constituted a tort. The trial court dismissed his claim, and a divided
Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed.
The majority doubted that an employer's threat to discharge
employees was unlawful merely because it was harmful to the
community: "Obviously the law can adopt and maintain no such
standards for judging human conduct; and men must be left,
without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to
discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no
cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an
unlawful act per se."' 10 5 Two Justices dissented, warning that the
employer's successful use of its power over a large workforce for
purposes outside the normal course of business had set a dangerous
precedent for a democratic society. "Capital may thus not only find
its own legitimate employment, but may control the employment
of others to an extent that in time may sap the foundations of our
free institutions .... ,,106
In a few employer-directed boycott cases following Payne, the
courts took the dissenters' warning to heart and awarded damages
to injured merchants, seeking to preserve the public's interest in
fair and free competition without being too obvious about
102. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5-6. See also Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225 (Me. 1883),
rejecting a cause of action for a plaintiff, who was the owner of a rental house,
against the defendant, who was the principal employer on the island where the
house was located. The owner of the house alleged that the employer refused to
employ anyone who would rent the plaintiff's house, although no one would
likely want the house unless they were employed by the defendant. In
dismissing the complaint, the court cited Payne.
Other cases upholding an employer's right to limit the business dealings of its
employees include Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 112
P. 886 (Cal. 1910) and Lewis v. Huie-Hodge Lumber Co., 46 So. 685 (La. 1908).
106. Payne, 81 Tenn. at 16.
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weakening the employment-at-will doctrine. 107 There was an
advantage in granting a cause of action to injured third parties. An
injured merchant's cause of action based on the mere threat of
discharge allowed a court to bring an end to the boycott even if the
employer had successfully cowed all its employees and had not
needed to retaliate against any of them. However, the lack of a
remedy for discharged employees was confirmed in another
variation of the employer-directed boycott: the "blacklist."
Employers formed blacklisting associations during the latter
part of the nineteenth century to deny listed workers the
opportunity to find reemployment in the same industry.
08
Blacklisting associations targeted mainly union agitators or
employees who resigned to protest low wages, 10 9 but an employer
could also use the blacklist to punish employees for other reasons.
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Ely," the plaintiff alleged that
the employer had discharged and blacklisted him for testifying
against the employer in another legal proceeding. The jury's
verdict was for the plaintiff, but the Supreme Court of Mississippi
reversed the judgment for evidentiary reasons and with a lecture on
the inviolability of employment-at-will."'11
In another blacklisting case, St. Louis Southwestern Railway
Co. of Texas v. Hixon, the defendant railroad discharged the
plaintiff and added him to the blacklist for objecting to the
continued operation of a train he believed was unsafe because of
defective brakes. 112 The plaintiff sued for unlawful interference
with his right to reemployment with other railroads in violation of
a local anti-blacklisting statute, but the court dismissed his
claim. 113 "It would indeed be a strange rule," the court concluded,
107. Wesley v. Native Lumber Co., 53 So. 346 (Miss. 1910) (recognizing
cause of action for merchant against employer who ordered employees not to do
business with him); Int'l & G.N. Ry. Co. v. Greenwood, 21 S.W. 559 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1893). Eventually, state legislatures responded to one aspect of the
problem by enacting statutes prohibiting company stores, although these laws
did not necessarily grant employees effective remedies. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Hillside Coal Co., 58 S.W. 441 (Ky. 1900) (describing a
Kentucky company store law). Many of these company store laws remain on the
books today. See, e.g., TEX. LAB. CODE § 52.041 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2009).
108. William Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REv.
1, 58 (1999); Calvert Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the
Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1084, n.50
(1937).
109. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pierson, 24 A. 65 (Pa. 1892) (rejecting a claim that
blacklisting was unlawful).
110. 35 So. 873 (Miss. 1904).
111. Id. at 874.
112. 37S.W.343(Tex. 1911).
113. Id. at 344.
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"to hold the employer liable in heavy damages, because his
understanding of what constituted insubordination was incorrect,
or because a court might conclude that a refusal to obey an order
was not.., an act of insubordination." 1
4
Wrongful discharge claims emanating from a variety of other
illicit employer schemes received the same dismissive treatment
during the first half of the twentieth century. In Comerford v.
International Harvester Co.,115 the court dismissed a complaint
alleging that a supervisor caused the plaintiffs discharge out of
frustration in failing to seduce the plaintiffs wife, an act which if
successful would have constituted criminal adultery." 6 In Odell v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co.," 7 the court held that an employer's
alleged criminal obstruction of justice, by discharging employees
for complying with subpoenas and testifying against the employer,
provided no basis for a tort action by the employees." 8
At the time of these decisions, the wrongs alleged by the
plaintiff employees might have seemed too isolated or eccentric to
justify even a narrow public policy exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine, especially if more conventional law enforcement
remedies were available to punish an employer lawbreaker.
Moreover, the failure of early legislative efforts to outlaw other
types of discrimination, retaliation, and interference provided good
reason to doubt the viability of any cause of action for wrongfully
discharged private sector employees. The first wave of anti-
retaliation and non-interference statutes for protected conduct by
private sector emgloyees prohibited the discharge or blacklisting of
union activists, I  but the United States Supreme Court struck
down such a statute in 1915 in Coppage v. Kansas,120 briefly
elevating the employment-at-will doctrine to a matter of
114. Id. at 345.
115. 178 So. 894 (Ala. 1938).
116. It was then a crime in Alabama to commit adultery, although the
legislature had abolished any civil action for the injured spouse. See Young v.
Young, 184 So. 187 (Ala.1938).
117. 201 F.2d 123 (1OthCir. 1953).
118. Id. at 127. See also Christy v. Petrus, 295 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1956) (law
making it a misdemeanor to discriminate against workers' compensation
claimant did not create private cause of action for discharged employee).
119. See, e.g., St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Hixon, 137 S.W. 343 (Tex.
1911) (applying Texas anti-blacklisting law); Commonwealth v. Reinecke Coal
Min. Co., 79 S.W. 287 (Ky. 1904) (upholding Kentucky's anti-blacklisting law);
State ex rel. Scheffer v. Justus, 88 N.W. 759 (Minn. 1902) (upholding
constitutionality of Minnesota's anti-blacklisting law); State v. Kreutzberg, 90
N.W. 1098 (Wis. 1902) (invalidating Wisconsin statute prohibiting discharge of
an employee for membership in a labor organization).
120. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
264 [Vol. 70
CITIZEN EMPLOYEES
substantive due process. 12 1 State courts followed suit and
invalidated a variety of other laws limiting an employer's
management of employees. 1
22
The turning point for legislative action restricting employment-
at-will in the private sector was the Supreme Court's decision in
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.123 Jones & Laughlin
upheld the National Labor Relations Act's (NLRA) prohibition of
discrimination against union activists, 124 and it also implicitly
upheld a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provision barring
discrimination against employees who assert their right to minimum
wages and overtime compensation. 125 The main purposes of the
NLRA and the FLSA were to create employee rights to bargain
collectively and to earn minimum compensation. 126 Anti-retaliation
and non-interference provisions were necessary to secure such rights
because employees could not reasonably be expected to form
unions, demand minimum pay, or assert other statutory rights if an
employer could fire them for doing so. Citizen employees gained
some incidental protection because neither the NLRA nor the FLSA
required that the employee filing an administrative charge must have
standing as an employee injured by the employer's action. 127 The
charging party might simply be a whistleblower with no personal
stake in the matter.
The NLRA and FLSA had much greater importance for citizen
employees as precedents and models for the future. The Court's
approval of those laws established once and for all that Congress
121. See also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating a
similar federal law).
122. O'Neil v. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887 (R.I. 1920); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.E. 807 (Mass. 1915).
123. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 28 U.S.C. §
158(a), makes it unlawful for an employer to "interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees" who exercise their rights to join or form unions or to engage in
collective bargaining. Section 8(a)(4) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4), makes it
unlawful for an employer to "discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony" under the Act.
125. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-218 (2006). Section 15 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215,
makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related
to [the Act], or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding .. .
126. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 (NLRA), 202 (FLSA) (2006).
127. The FLSA prohibits retaliation against any employee, not just an
employee who sought his own unpaid wages. 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2006). See also
Onken v. W.L. May Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (D. Or. 2004). The NLRA
allows any person to file a charge. See ROBERT GORMAN & MATTHEW FINKIN,
BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW 10 (2d ed. 2004).
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and state legislatures could restrict an employer's control over its
employees without violating the employer's constitutional rights. If
strengthening employee bargaining power or setting minimum
employment terms were sufficient grounds for regulation of
employee relations, it followed that Congress and state legislatures
stood on even firmer ground when protecting the public's own
direct interests.
Moreover, taken together, the NLRA and FLSA exemplified all
the future ways of addressing the full range of an employer's
potential responses to protected employee conduct. First, by
making it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate," both laws
clearly prohibited an employer from discharging an employee in
retaliation for his protected activity. 128 Second, by prohibiting
discrimination, both laws also made it possible to remedy a variety
of lesser forms of retaliation. Discrimination could include any
retaliatory discipline, denial of benefits, or other term or condition
of employment. 129 Many years after the NLRA and FLSA, it
became clear that "discrimination" might also include retaliatory
harassment without any tangible job action.130
Third, the NLRA made it unlawful for an employer to
"interfere" with protected conduct.' 31 A rule of non-interference
was especially important in situations in which the employer
prevented protected conduct without specifically intending to do so
and without "discriminating."' 132 For example, an employer's rule
barring employee solicitation at the workplace could constitute
unlawful "interference" even if the employer was motivated by
considerations of efficiency, and its rule applied without
discrimination to all forms of solicitation. If the effect of the rule
was to interfere with protected employee activity, an
administrative agency or court could still find that the need to
protect employee conduct outweighed the employer's leitimate
interests and that the employer's rule must be struck down. State
legislatures had already applied a variation of this idea in
protecting citizen employees in the exercise of their right to
128. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3) (NLRA), 215(a)(3) (FLSA) (2006).
129. The NLRA prohibits "discrimination in regard to .. . any term or
condition of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006). The FLSA makes it
unlawful for an employer to discharge "or in any other manner discriminate"
against an employee who has engaged in protected conduct. See also Hernandez
v. City Wide Insulation of Madison, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 682 (W.D. Wis.
2007).
130. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510U.S. 17 (1993).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).




vote;134 consequently, the NLRA became a much larger proving
ground for prohibiting "interference."
Within a few years after the NLRA and FLSA, Congress
enacted its earliest substantial citizen employee law, the Selective
Training and Service Act (STSA) of 1940.'3 5 The STSA, together
with a series of successor laws, prohibited job discrimination and
guaranteed job restoration rights to employees called away from
civilian jobs to serve in active or reserve military duty. 136 While
these laws certainly benefited the personal interests of many
employees, the underlying purpose was to promote national
security by encouraging military service, reducing one
demoralizing effect of involuntary service 137 and reallocating part
of the burden of service to non-serving employees.' 38 When the
Supreme Court first considered and interpreted the STSA's job
protection and restoration provisions in 1946, constitutionality was
taken for granted. 139
B. Judicial Activism
By the mid-twentieth century, it could no longer be said that an
employer's freedom to discipline or terminate an employee was
absolute. Thus far, however, the courts had assumed no independent
role in this development. Restraints against the employer's right to
discipline were exclusively the product of narrow legislative action,
or of somewhat broader executive action in the case of public
employees. There are no reported court decisions imposing non-
134. See supra pp. 23-24.
135. J. Res., 76th Cong., § 3, 54 Stat. 858, 859 (1940). The Selective
Training and Service Act was not entirely unprecedented. U.S. government
employees have enjoyed the right of job restoration after active military duty
since World War I. Act of May 12, 1917, 40 Stat. 72. See also Ballfv. Kranz, 82
F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1936).
136. The current version of the law is the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333 (2006).
137. This belief is reflected in the statement of purpose in the current version
of the law, USSER, which is:
(1) to encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services by
eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and
employment which can result from such service; [and]
(2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of persons performing
service in the uniformed services . . .by providing for the prompt
reemployment of such persons upon completion of such service....
38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2006).
138. Employees who did not serve in the armed service were burdened under
these laws because they were subject to dismissal or loss of opportunities for
promotion as a result ofjob restoration of employees returning from service.
139. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).
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statutory limits on an employer's contractual right to discharge an
employee before 1959, when the California Supreme Court decided
Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396.140
Petermann was the first, and for many years only, reported
instance of a court venturing to limit an employer's right to
terminate irrespective of any express or implied agreement
concerning job security, and without any statutory cause of action.
The employee in Petermann alleged that his employer, a labor
union, discharged him for testifying truthfully and refusing to obey
instructions to commit perjury before a state legislative
committee. 14 1 It was evidently undisputed that the employment
was "at will.' 42 Nevertheless, Petermann alleged that his wrongful
discharge claim was "based upon a contract of employment,"
143
and the court agreed that his allegations stated a claim against the
union: "To hold that one's continued employment could be made
contingent upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance
of his employer would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the
part of both the employee and employer and would serve to
contaminate the honest administration of public affairs."'"
As a "contract" case based on considerations of "public
policy," Petermann was unusual, either for contract law in general
or employment relations in particular. Courts had long ago adopted
the practice of declining to enforce private agreements against
public policy, 145 but here was a case in which the court created a
new contract duty and enforced it in the interest of public policy. 14 6
The employment law precedents the court cited were not on
point. 147 In short, Petermann became the precedent. 148
140. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959).
141. Id. at 26.
142. Id. at 27.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 27.
145. ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1373-1378, 1154-71
(1952).
146. Courts that apply a common law public policy rule of wrongful
discharge now generally recognize the cause of action as a tort. See, e.g., Foley
v. Interactive Data Sys., Inc., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
147. The authorities cited by the court involved the issue of whether an
employer could assert the forfeiture of an employee's contingent deferred
compensation by discharging the employee without cause. Id. at 28.
148. Westlaw lists more than 276 court decisions and hundreds of listed
appellate briefs, court memoranda, and secondary legal sources citing
Petermann as of February 10, 2009.
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Today, Petermann is often described as the "seminal" public
policy-based wrongful discharge case, 149 but its immediate impact
was minimal. Even in California, lower courts seemed to regard
Petermann as sui generis,' 50 and they remained reluctant to usurp
the legislative function in creating a new cause of action.15 1 The
year after Petermann, a California court of appeals considered an
employer's termination of an employee for admitting to a local
court that she was available for jury duty. In Mallard v. Boring, the
court dismissed the employee's public policy-based wrongful
discharge without even citing Petermann. If the allegations were
true, the employer was "selfish and shortsighted," its actions were
to be "deplored," and its motive was "reprehensible."' 153 But while
the court was sympathetic to the plaintiff's argument for a public
policy-based cause of action the issue in the court's view was for
the legislature to decide)1' Outside California, courts largely
ignored Petermann and continued to decline invitations to impose
judicially-crafted limits on the termination of employment.' 55
Professor Lawrence Blades, a vanguard advocate for limiting the
employment-at-will doctrine, appears to have overlooked the case
entirely. 1
56
The more likely tipping point for judicial intervention in the
name of public interests was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.'" Title VII addressed specific types of status-based
discrimination, including race, color, national origin, sex, and
149. Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will-
When Should Courts Defer to the Legislature, 72 NEB. L. REv. 956, 964 (1993).
150. Among the unique and potentially distinguishable circumstances of
Petermann was that the defendant employer was a labor organization, the case
involved Petermann's right to union membership as well as employment, and
the law required the union to follow principles of democratic governance in its
management. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006).
151. The few California cases relying on Petermann did so in connection
with statutes that seemed by their very terms to prohibit employers from
interfering with certain rights of employees. Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock
Inn, Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (applying statute that
provided that employees engaged in organizational or collective bargaining
activities "shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers").
152. Cal. Rptr. 171 (Cal. App. 1960).
153. Id. at 174.
154. Id. at 175.
155. A few courts of other states that considered Petermann before the late
nineteen seventies pointedly rejected it. See, e.g., Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319
A.2d 174 (1974).
156. See Blades, supra note 80.
157. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2006)).
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religious discrimination. 158 It was not a law for citizen employees
except insofar as it protected claimants and other employees
upholding Title VII or opposing unlawful discrimination.
154
However, Title VII substantially devalued managerial prerogative
in employee relations. In support of the public's interest in social
and economic equality, the law imposed severe restrictions on an
employer's discretion in selecting, managing, and terminating
employees. As a practical matter, Title VII required any litigation-
averse employer to institute measures to promote fair and rational
employment action. While there was still managerial discretion
worth defending from an employer's point of view, it was
discretion much compromised for the sake of a particular public
interest. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act soon
followed, compromising managerial discretion for the sake of the
public's interest in preventing premature involuntary retirement of
older workers. 160 The defense for an employer's freedom to
manage its workforce and to contract for employment-at-will now
seemed much less compelling,
Within a few years after the adoption and implementation of
these statutes, a series of citizen employee lawsuits reached the
highest courts of a number of states and initiated a period of
widespread judicial activism in employment law. Between 1975
and 1985, the courts of at least seven more states (in addition to
California) recognized and applied a common law "public policy"
exception to an employer's freedom to terminate in situations
involving citizen employees. The courts of Oregon 161 and
Hawaii 1 1 held that an employer cannot lawfully discharge an
employee to prevent or punish his service as a witness or juror.
The Supreme Court of Texas163 held that an employer cannot
lawfully discharge an employee for refusing to carry out a criminal
act. Courts in West Virginia, 64 Connecticut,165 Washington, 166 and
New Hampshire 167 held that an employer cannot lawfully
discharge an employee for his efforts to comply with the law or to
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
159. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (2006).
160. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006)). The
ADEA's anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), tracks the language of
Title VII.
161. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
162. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982).
163. Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
164. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va. 1978).
165. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980).
166. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984).
167. Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981).
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assure public safety. During the same short span of time, courts in
an even greater number of states declared in dicta that they would
likely recognize similar causes of action for citizen employees
given the right set of facts.
168
The emergence of a common law rule for citizen employees as
one branch of what became known as the "public policy"
exception 169 added momentum to a related development in the
1980s: growing judicial willingness to entertain employee efforts
to prove an employer had promised to discharge only for good or
just cause.' 7° In some states courts went much further, accepting a
theory of implied promise and essentially adopting a reverse
presumption in favor of promised job security in certain
circumstances. 17 1 A more favorable judicial view of alleged
express or implied promises of job security offered citizen
employees an alternative theory for protection against retaliation
168. See, e.g., M. B. M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ark. 1980);
Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977); Abrisz v. Pulley
Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Adler v. Am. Standard Corp.,
432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J.
1980); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). See also
Winther v. DEC Int'l, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 100 (D. Colo. 1985) (federal court
predicting that Colorado law would follow example of other states and adopt the
public policy exception).
169. See Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1931 (1983). For many courts,
the public policy exception included protection not just for citizen employees
but also for employees acting in their own personal interest for benefits or
protections granted to them by a state legislature. See Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 839 (Wis. 1983); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo &
Ironton R.R. Co., 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft
No. 1 Apr. 7, 2008). Thus, in upholding employee claims based on alleged
retaliation for seeking workers' compensation benefits, courts typically invoked
the common law public policy exception in the absence of statutory protection.
They reasoned that public policy demands a reliable system for compensating
victims of workplace injuries, but such a system cannot fulfill its purpose if
employers are free to deter employees from using it. Brown v. Pick 'N Save
Food Stores, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1142 (E.D. Wis. 2001); Kelsey v. Motorola,
Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978); Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297
N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
170. The presumption that employment is at will has always been rebuttable,
but it was once particularly difficult to rebut because courts tended to doubt such
promises, and they routinely invoked technical rules of contract law to defeat
claims based on alleged employer promises. See generally CARLSON,
EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 43, at 685-88. Courts in many states adopted a
more favorable view of such claims beginning in the 1980s. See, e.g., Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980); Ohanian
v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985).
171. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
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because a court was not likely to view an employee's reasonable
conduct in the public interest as "cause" for discharge. 172 The new
contract theories were ultimately disappointing for citizen
employees and others alleging wrongful discharge because of the
ease with which employers disclaimed and precluded express or
implied promises of job security. 173 Nevertheless, the employment
contract cases energized the debate about wrongful discharge of
employees, and the limitations of contract theory strengthened the
argument for non-contractual protection for citizen employees.
An important practical limitation of a prospective new common
law for citizen employees was that it was largely limited to
remedying retaliatory discharge and was not well suited for
addressing lesser or more subtle forms of retaliation. For a citizen
employee who has already lost his job, not much more can be lost
by filing a lawsuit. A citizen employee suffering lesser forms of
retaliatory discrimination stands in a very different position. Filing
a lawsuit is a declaration of total war against his current employer.
Both parties will find work under these circumstances to be
especially stressful. Moreover, an employee in the midst of
litigation with his current employer may find his effort to get a new
job all the more difficult. Also, there is no guarantee that a lawsuit
will be successful or yield fully compensatory relief. Common law
citizen employee actions are even less suitable for dealing with
employer interference. If an employer denies an employee's
request for time off to appear as a witness or discourages
employees from cooperating with law enforcement authorities by
treating missed work time as an unexcused absence, a lawsuit by a
current employee is unlikely. Thus, common law actions by citizen
employees are almost universally discharge cases.
174
C. Legislative Activism
Judicial activism for citizen employees was matched by
legislative activism. Congress, which long ago had started the
practice of supplementing the enforcement provision of every
employee rights law with an anti-retaliation provision, added new
anti-retaliation provisions to an array of non-employment
regulations of business and industry. During the 1970s and '80s
alone, Congress added at least eight different anti-retaliation
provisions for private sector employees who reported employer
172. See, e.g., id. (employee alleged he was discharged for objecting to
company's "sweetheart" deal with a labor organization).
173. See CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 43, at 716-30.
174. See id. at 787-88.
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violations of particular federal statutes.17 5 During the same time
period, a ninth law granted federal jurors job protection rihts
analogous to those already enjoyed by military personnel.' A
similar proliferation of anti-retaliation statutes occurred at the state
level.'17 The sheer number of such laws, together with new court-
175. In 1972, Congress added whistleblower protection to the Water
Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). In 1974, Congress included
whistleblower protection in the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9
(2006). In 1976, Congress included whistleblower protection in the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2006), and the Solid Waste Disposal
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2006). In 1977, Congress enacted whistleblower
protection in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (2006). In 1978, Congress enacted
whistleblower protection in the Energy Reorganization Act. 42 U.S.C. § 5851
(2006). In 1986, Congress amended the False Claims Act to include anti-
retaliation protection for employees. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006). In the same
year, Congress enacted protection for employees of military contractors. 10
U.S.C. § 2409 (2006). In 1989, Congress enacted protection for employees of
insured depository institutions. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. § 1831j (2006).
Congress continued to add whistleblower protection to other industry
regulations in the 1990s. See Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, 41
U.S.C. §265 (2006), and a set of whistleblower protection provisions enacted in
1994 for employees reporting violations of various transportation industry safety
standards. 49 U.S.C. § 20109 (2006) (railroads), § 31105 (2006) (commercial
motor vehicles), § 42121 (2006) (aviation) and § 60129 (2006) (pipelines).
The first decade of the twenty-first century saw not only the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513, 1514A (2006), but also a whistleblower provision for
employees of the Energy Department and its contractors engaged in "defense
activities." 50 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006). In 2009, Congress included whistleblower
protection in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 115, 296-97 (2009).
176. Jury Systems Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-572, § 6(a)(1),
92 Stat. 2456 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2006)). The Jury
Systems Improvement Act provides that "[n]o employer shall discharge,
threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any permanent employee by reason
of such employee's jury service .... " 28 U.S.C. §1875(a) (2006). Before this
Act, federal judges sometimes held employers in contempt for interfering with
the service of federal jurors, but employees were frequently unwilling to report
against their employers without protection against further retaliation. H.R. REP.
No. 95-1652, at 7 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5477, 5480.
177. See supra note 4. Like Congress, the state legislatures have routinely
included anti-retaliation protection with every major employment statute.
Workers' compensation laws are an important exception. For decades after the
enactment of first workers compensation laws, employers remained free to
retaliate against employees who sought benefits for work-related injuries. See E.
Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation and the Persistence of
Occupational Injuries, 31 Hou. L. REv. 119, 220-25 (1994). The first case
recognizing a court-declared cause of action for retaliatory discharge against a
workers' compensation claimant appears to have been Frampton v. Central
Indiana. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). Today, it is not unusual for a
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made doctrines, led some commentators to opine, prematurely, that
the employment-at-will doctrine was all but dead.
Legislative activism and judicial activism were not necessarily
complementary. To some extent each undercut the other. Whatever
argument one might have made for a public policy or citizen
employee exception as an evolutionary advancement of the
common law of contracts or torts, legislative activism in the same
field sharpened the issue as to whether courts had overstepped the
bounds of adjudication and were engaging in naked lawmaking.' 79
The argument in favor of legislative action might have prevailed
quickly if Congress and the state legislatures had convincingly
occupied and commanded the field as they did in the case of race,
sex, and other forms of discrimination. Instead, Congress and most
state legislatures acted selectively and narrowly in enacting
legislation for citizen employees. Did legislation excluding many
citizen employees implicitly grant their employers unrestrained
managerial discretion? Or alternatively, was narrow legislation an
acknowledgement of the difficulty of crafting a broad statute and
an implicit deferral to incremental, case-by-case expansion of
court-made law for excluded citizen employees?
Austin v. Healthtrust, Inc.180 and Murphy v. American Home
Products Corp.18 1 are examples of the two opposing views. In
Austin the Texas Supreme Court, which was among the first to
protect employees who refused to commit illegal acts,' 82 declined
to protect whistleblowers because "the Legislature has been so
proactive in promulgating statutes that prohibit retaliation against
whistleblowers .... 183 The court noted an earlier failed effort to
enact a general whistleblower protection law in Texas. "Rather
than create a one-size-fits-all whistleblower statute, the Texas
Legislature has instead opted to enact statutes that protect specific
classes of employees from various types of retaliation."' The
legislature's implicit message, in the court's view, was to deny
protection for citizen employees outside legislatively protected
classes. "Were we to create a broad-based whistleblower cause of
workers' compensation law to include its own anti-retaliation provision. See,
e.g., TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-.003 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2009).
178. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at- Will: The Impending
Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 653 (2000).
179. See, e.g., Fahleson, supra note 150.
180. 967 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. 1998).
181. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
182. See supra p. 34.
183. Austin, 967 S.W.2d. at 400.
184. Id. at 401.
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action, it would in large part eviscerate the specific measures the
Legislature has already adopted."' 185 The court's deferral to the
legislature in Austin left the plaintiff, a whistleblowing nurse, with
neither common law nor statutory remedy. The statute that most
nearly covered her situation required a nurse to report to the
agency that licensed nurses,' 86 but the employer had discharged the
plaintiff after she made her report to her supervisor and before she
could take the matter to the licensing authorities.' 
87
In Murphy,188 the New York Court of Appeals addressed a
different side of the debate: assuming courts could legitimately fill
gaps left by legislators, should they, or is legal protection for
citizen employees unsuitable for courts to address as part of the
evolving common law? The employee in Murphy alleged that he
was discharged for reporting to the company's directors that
managers had inflated the company's income to increase the
amount of their bonuses under a management incentive plan. The
court dismissed his claim. In the court's view, the creation of the
proposed cause of action was better left to the legislature. The
legislature had better resources and a clearer responsibility for
investigating the nature and bounds of "public policy."'
189
Moreover, the court observed, while the judiciary can declare new
rights and duties, the legislature can do much more. It can design
detailed rules for the "configuration" of newly declared rights and
duties, including rules of procedure. 90 In declining to invoke its
power to declare the common law, the court expectantly noted the
legislature's consideration of a bill to prohibit retaliation against
employees for "taking actions which benefit the general public or
society."' 191 The bill subsequently failed, and today New York still
lacks a general anti-retaliation statute.'
92
185. Id. See also Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y.
1983) (noting a number of existing or proposed anti-retaliation laws in New
York as one reason for declining to recognize a common law whistleblower
cause of action).
186. At the time of the Austin decision, the law was codified at TEX. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4525a (Vernon 1976). The same law is now codified at TEX.
OCc. CODE ANN. § 301.413 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2009).
187. Austin, 967 S.W.2d at 400.
188. Murphy, 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 90 (describing 1981 NY Assembly Bill A 2566).
192. See also Weider v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992) (upholding
employee's contract claim but rejecting his abusive discharge claim because
expansion of whistleblower protection "must come from the Legislature").
In 1984 New York did enact a limited whistleblower law for any employee
who reports an employer violation creating a substantial and specific danger to
2009]
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D. The Unfinished Law for Citizen Employees
Today, citizen employee law takes different shapes in different
jurisdictions, reflecting uncertain feelings about citizen employees
and difficulties in defining conduct and policies that deserve anti-
retaliation protection. The states, which remain especially
important in the law of citizen employees, may be divided roughly
into three groups. The first group consists of states having no
general statutory or common law rule of wide application. States in
this group frequently do possess a collection of specialized statutes
or narrow common law rules, leaving significant gaps in
protection. This first group remains the most numerous. 19 Texas, a
typical example from this group, has at least fifteen anti-retaliation
statutes, all narrow in scope and protecting only employees in
specific industries or occupations or employees upholding specific
laws. 194 Despite the impressive number of Texas statutes, it is still
quite possible that an employee deserving of protection is not
covered under any law.
In a second group, courts have established comparatively
general and comprehensive law for citizen employees as an
public health or safety. The statute protects an employee only if he successfully
proves an actual violation of the sort for which the law provides protection.
Bartel v. NBC Universal, 543 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2008) (interpreting New York
law as of 2008); Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 667 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1996).
193. In the following cases courts denied anti-retaliation protection to citizen
employees or other plaintiffs seeking a variant of the public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine: Hoffinan-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.
2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1987); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d
436 (Del. 1996); Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994);
Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 528 S.E.2d 238, 239 (Ga. 2000); Metzger v.
DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165 (Ill. 2004); Buckner v. At. Plant Maint., Inc., 694
N.E.2d 565, 568-69 (Ill. 1998); Goodman v. Wesley Med. Ctr., L.L.C., 78 P.3d
817 (Kan. 2003); Airdrie Stud, Inc. v. Reed, No. 2001-CA-001397-MR, 2003
WL 22796469 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2004); Sanchez v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 860
So. 2d 277, 280-81 (La. App. 2003); Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d
152, 155 (Me. 1991); Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482 (Md. 2002);
Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241 (Mass. 1992);
Suchodolski v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710 (Mich. 1982); Hedglin
v. City of Willmar, 582 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Minn. 1998); McLaughlin v.
Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283 (Pa. 2000); Pacheo v. Raytheon
Co., 623 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1993); Miller v. Fairfield Cmtys., Inc., 382 S.E.2d 16,
19 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
194. See, e.g., Barron v. Cook Children's Health Care Sys., 218 S.W.3d 806
(Tex. App. 2007) (nurse lacked whistleblower cause of action; statute that
provided such protection applied to whistleblowing against certain types of
"treatment facilities," but her alleged report was against a treatment facility not
within the scope of the law).
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outgrowth of the common law of torts or contracts. Ohio is a
leading example in this group. Ohio courts developed a law of
citizen employees case-by-case over several years and in a variety
of settings. The Ohio Supreme Court integrated these decisions in
a declaration of general principles in Collins v. Rizkana.195 Collins
requires a citizen employee to show he acted in support of a
"clear" public policy, but it permits an employer's defense that its
action against the employee was because of an overriding
legitimate business justification. 196 In states with a general
common law for citizen employees, there is frequently an issue
whether there is any remedy for employees suffering lesser
discrimination or interference. 197
A third group includes states in which the law is primarily
statutory, based on a single act of general application, but with
important local variations and no predominant model. New
Jersey's Conscientious Employee Protection Act is a well-known
example. The New Jersey Act protects an employee's opposition to
activity the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a "law"
or is incompatible with a "clear" policy regarding the environment
or public health, safety, or welfare.' Such laws are seldom as
comprehensive as they could be. The New Jersey law, for example,
omits protection for employees who perform civic duties such as
serving as witnesses,'99r although such employees might still be
protected under other specialized statutes. Where citizen
employees are protected by statute from retaliatory discharge, they
are also more likely to be protected against lesser discrimination
195. 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995).
196. Id. at 657-58. The Ohio court borrowed elements of its principles from
a test proposed by Professor Henry Perritt, Jr. See H. Perritt, The Future of
Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self Interest Lie?, 58 U.
CIN. L. REv. 397, 398-99 (1989). California is another state in which the law of
citizen employees is part of the common law. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d
680 (Cal. 1992); Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157 (Cal. 1997).
197. The issue can also arise under an anti-retaliation statute, depending on
the way the statute defines or states an employer's unlawful action. See, e.g.,
Carver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 2005) (no cause of action for
retaliatory harassment under New Jersey statute).
198. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). Other state
statutes of general application for citizen employees include ALASKA STAT. §
39.90.100 (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (Supp. 2008); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(a) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-20 (2004 &
Supp. 2005).
199. However, the New Jersey law does protect employees who testify in
legal proceedings concerning the employer's violation of the law. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
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because statutes frequently borrow the language of other laws
prohibiting "discrimination.,
20 0
General statutes such as those in the third group of states also
raise a question concerning the subsequent viability of pre-existing
common law, which in New Jersey was already substantial.20 1 If
the statute supersedes the common law, the courts might lack
authority to offer remedies for retaliation if the employee, his
conduct, the policy he upheld, or his employer lie outside the
words of the statute. New Jersey's legislature chose a mixed
model. The statute does not supplant the common law, although an
employee must elect to proceed based on one remedy or the
other.203 Thus, the common law could still evolve in New Jersey if
the existing law, statutory or court-made, proves inadequate. At the
same time, the statute prevents the courts from withdrawing more
than a certain level of protection already achieved.
In the case of employees who act to uphold federal policies,
federal law provides the most important source of protection.
However, federal law follows the manner of the first group of
states: mainly specialized statutes limited to enforcement of
particular laws or covering only certain industries or occupations.
The best protection, at least when judged by substantive
provisions, is for employees of federal agencies. Federal
employees who report violations of the law or disobey orders to
violate the law are protected by the Whistleblower Protection Act
(WPA).2 4 Any true citizen employee whose conduct does not fit
within the range of the WPA will likely find protection in general
civil service law, which prohibits adverse employment action
except "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service. '
2°5
In the case of the private sector, however, federal law is
scattershot. There is no basis for a federal common law for citizen
employees.20 6 Thus, protection is exclusively statutory, but there is
no statute of general application for private sector employees as
200. See sources cited supra note 195.
201. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
202. See, e.g., Galati v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 69 P.3d 1011, 1013 n.2 (Ariz.
2003).
203. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-8 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). See also
Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 961 A.2d 1167 (N.J. 2008).
204. 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006). But see Secunda, supra note 93.
205. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513-7543 (2006).
206. See, e.g., Emery v. Ne. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., No. 02 C 9303,
2003 WL 22176077 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2003) (finding no federal "common




there is for federal government employees. It is true that nearly all
federal employment discrimination statutes20 7 and most of an
assortment of other employment statutes include protection for
employees who report or complain about an employer's violations
of those laws.20 8 But protection is less certain for a citizen
employee who acts in support of a non-employment law and not in
support of a personal claim or right. Not all federal laws are
bolstered by anti-retaliation provisions and those that are can vary
widely in coverage, methodology, and effectiveness. Older federal
statutes in particular tend to suffer from short-sighted drafting and
arbitrary distinctions between employees who file formal
complaints and those who complain first to their employers and are
discharged before making a formal complaint.
20 9
207. For Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, see 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-3
(2006). For the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, see 29 U.S.C. §
623(d) (2006). For the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, see 42 U.S.C. §
12203(a)-(b) (2006).
At least one major employment discrimination law of the era lacked a clear
protection against retaliation. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
112, 87 Stat. 390 did not contain its own express prohibition against retaliation.
However, the Rehabilitation Act incorporated by reference certain enforcement
provisions of Title VII. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2006). The courts interpreted this link
to Title VII as including Title VII's prohibition against retaliation. See, e.g.,
Hoyt v. St. Mary's Rehab. Ctr., 711 F.2d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 1983).
208. For the anti-retaliation clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, see 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2006). For the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, see 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). For the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, see 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006). For the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act of 1983, see 29 U.S.C. § 1855 (2006). For
the Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986 (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of national origin), see 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5) (2006). For the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, see 29 U.S.C. § 2002(4) (2006).
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) of 1988,
29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2006), which requires an employer to provide advance
notice of impending layoffs, is one example of an employee rights statute that
does not include anti-retaliation protection. Anti-retaliation protection might
have seemed unnecessary because the principle beneficiaries of the WARN
Act--employees about to be laid off-are about to lose their jobs whether or not
they complain. Still, one can imagine another employee who acted to report or
prevent his employer's false assertion of an excuse for a lack of notice based on
"circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable." See 29 U.S.C. §
2102(b)(2)(A) (2006). Because the WARN Act lacks an anti-retaliation
provision, such an employee evidently would not be protected from retaliation.
Still another federal employment law that appears to lack protection against
retaliation is the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006).
209. See, e.g., Ball v. Memphis Bar B Q, 228 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2000)
(interpreting one of the oldest anti-retaliation provisions, Section 15 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2006), which prohibits retaliation against
an employee who "has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding").
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Even the most heralded anti-retaliation statute, the SOX,
suffers from restrictive coverage. SOX applies to publicly traded
corporations and their employees.21 ° It does not reach privately
owned corporations or non-profit entities. 21 ' Moreover, recent
decisions suggest that SOX might not protect employees of a
subsidiary of a publicly traded corporation if the subsidiary itself is
not publicly traded.21 2 SOX also has important restrictions insofar
as the policies an employee might seek to uphold. An employee's
conduct is not protected under the Act unless he reported a
violation of one of a specific set of federal securities and fraud
213
statutes. An employee is protected if he reports fraud against
shareholders but not necessarily if he reports fraud against a
government agency not involved in the regulation of securities.
2 14
Even if the employee's conduct relates to one of the laws SOX is
designed to enforce, the employee must have acted in a manner
consistent with the Act's description of protected conduct, which is
to "provide information" or "assist in an investigation." 21 5
Refusing to engage in or to assist illegal activity does not appear to
fall within this definition. 216 Even providing information might not
be enough under certain circumstances. At least one court has
denied protection in the case of an employee's report of accounting
problems that might have been the first sign of fraud because the
210. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006).
211. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron. org: Whey Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not
Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205
(2004).
212. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 18, at 33. But see
O'Mahony v. Accenture Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (publicly
traded parent corporation could be named as defendant for actions of subsidiary
if parent gave grounds for piercing corporate veil).
213. The Act protects an employee only if he reported a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, a rule or regulation of the Securities or Exchange
Commission, or a federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. 18 U.S.C. §
1514A(a)(1) (2006). The mere possibility that reported "fraud" could adversely
affect the company's financial condition, and thereby be adverse to shareholders,
is not enough to qualify as the basis for protected reporting. Moberly, Unfulfilled
Expectations, supra note 18, at 35, 54-55. See also Geoffrey C. Rapp, Beyond
Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities
Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REv. 91, 110 (2007) (summarizing decisions of
administrative law judges under SOX).
214. Van Asdale v. Int'l Game, Tech., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (D. Nev. 2007)
215. 18 U.S.C. § 1541A(a)(1) (2006).
216. Getman v. Sw. Securitiers, No. 04-059 (ARB July 29, 2005)
(unpublished opinion by the Administrative Review Board of the Department of




employee failed to explain to the employer "why she believed the
actions... would violate securities laws and constitute fraud., 2
17
The federal approach does offer two important innovations that
are missing at the state level. One is an administrative scheme
intended to achieve quick compensation or reconciliation and
better designed than the judiciary for dealing with discrimination
or interference less than retaliatory discharge. Although there are
many different federal statutes for whistleblowers and other citizen
employees, claims under most of these statutes are funneled into a
single administrative process managed by the Department of
Labor, which has delegated the process to the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration.
2 18
The other federal innovation lies in a number of provisions of
SOX, where Congress prescribed what Professor Moberly has
described as the "structural model" to encourage
whistleblowing.2 1 9 The structural model offers more than a remedy
against retaliatory discharge. It requires the establishment of
protected channels of communication and investigation to address
employee questions, reports, and grievances. By this and other
means, SOX addresses lesser discrimination and interference much
better than would be possible if citizen employee protection were
left exclusively to the common law and judicial action.
III. A PATH TO A UNIFIED LAW FOR CITIZEN EMPLOYEES
A. Overview
The law of citizen employees has evolved by so many separate
roads that it remains without any sure center or model. The result
is incomplete coverage, thwarted sharing of experience across
jurisdictions and regulatory schemes, and impeded development of
coherent and widely shared principles. The solution to these
problems involves two parts. First, lawmakers should recognize
citizen employees as a discreet class having a common set of
problems and presenting a common set of challenges. Citizen
employees resemble other employee groups defined by conduct,
but they are distinguished by the purpose or effect of their
conduct-upholding public interests. Recognizing citizen
employees as a class would facilitate discussion about the ideal
balance of public, employee, and employer interests and about the
best rules and remedies for achieving balance.
217. Platone v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 548 F.3d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 2008).
218. See CARLsoN, EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 43, at 501-02.
219. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 53.
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Second, lawmakers should enact a law with broadly stated
principles analogous to the expansive anti-discrimination language
of Title VII, granting a mandate for courts to develop a true
"common law" for citizen employees. The model for such a law
might come from Congress, perhaps by consolidating existing
federal laws into a single act, or it might come from the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or the
American Law Institute. In fact, the American Law Institute has
already embarked on a similar project as part of a larger proposed
Restatement of Employment Law.220  The Restatement of
Employment is a step in the right direction, but the ideal approach
for citizen employees would be a statute that would erase any
doubt regarding the judiciary's authority and responsibility to
develop the law within the limits of the statute.
The two subparts that follow present a more complete
statement of this proposal in two contexts. The immediately
following subpart describes the usual objections to expanded
protection for citizen employees, addresses the merits of these
objections, and suggests ways the law might best deal with some of
these objections. The next subpart addresses some of the unique
challenges of drafting legal protection for citizen employees.
B. Objections to Protection for Citizen Employees
1. Management and Defense Costs
If the importance of protecting citizen employees is so obvious,
why have lawmakers so persistently resisted adopting the kind of
broadly inclusive anti-retaliation statute that victims of status-
based discrimination enjoy under Title VII? Despite widespread
media coverage and public sympathy for citizen employees, the
opposition to civil remedies for citizen employees has been
sufficient to stifle or at least pare legislative action in many
jurisdictions. To a certain degree, this opposition is not surprising.
Business interests nearly always resist relinquishing any part of an
employer's freedom to manage or terminate employees. As noted
earlier, the right to manage and discharge employees serves
important and legitimate business purposes for an employer. Any
exception to the employer's right to discharge at will tends to
increase costs and diminish the employer's control and
management of the business.22 1 Thus, a proposal to grant civil
220. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THiRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note
148, § 4.02.
221. See Hubbell, supra note 46, at 99-100; Epstein, supra note 47, at 970-71.
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remedies against retaliatory employers is bound to incite the same
resistance that confronts any proposed new exception to
employment-at-will.
Moreover, laws prohibiting retaliation against employee
conduct of any sort are susceptible to special criticism. First, a
putative citizen employee is not necessarily motivated by his
devotion to the public interest. He might have blown the whistle,
refused to obey instructions, or taken time off from work for a
"civic duty" for mainly selfish, personal, or vengeful purposes. For
example, an employee might threaten to accuse a manager of
wrongdoing simply to gain some advantage over the manager or to
avoid disciplinary action. An employee who has already suffered
adverse action might blow the whistle as his own form of
retaliation.222
Of course, the same objection might be leveled against any law
that prohibits a particular employer motivation for adverse action.
An employee bargaining for better terms or seeking revenge
against a supervisor might accuse the supervisor of race or sex
discrimination or harassment as easily as fraud or health code
violations. However, a vengeful or manipulative employee can
threaten greater harm as a putative citizen employee than as a
putative discrimination victim. A charge of discrimination by an
individual employee poses a certain range of potential cost and
liability for the employer.22 3 The liability is generally no more than
the employee's personal loss. In contrast, a putative employee who
regards the full range of laws, regulations, and public policies to be
"enforced" in the modem workplace can greatly amplify his threat
and bargaining power either by the number or magnitude of
charges he asserts. Even if the employee's charges are unfounded,
the cost of investigating and litigating corporate fraud or other
public policy issues raised by a citizen employee can still be more
threatening than a discrimination claim.
Laws prohibiting retaliation are probably also more likely than
discrimination laws to encourage false or mainly tactical charges.
Consider for purposes of comparison a typical discriminatory
discharge case. A law prohibiting discriminatory discharge on the
basis of race, gender, or age depends on proof of a trait that is
usually fixed, clearly identifiable, and not easily adopted. Granted,
membership in a minority or historically victimized class is not
necessarily required to charge discrimination. A charging party
222. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 844 (Wis.
1983) (Day, concurring); Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 53, at 1156.
223. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006) (capping an employer's liability for
certain discrimination claims).
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might claim "reverse" discrimination, such as discrimination
against young, white Episcopalians. However, a false charge of
reverse discrimination is likely to be unpersuasive and relatively
easy to rebut, often on summary judgment, because the charging
party must overcome the natural assumption that managers do not
discriminate against their own kind.2  It is also true that most
employees can assert membership in at least one traditional class
of victims, but even a plausible victim of discrimination faces a
special hurdle in a discriminatory discharge case. If the employer
who fired the employee once hired the employee, the employee
must overcome the natural assumption that the employer was not
prejudiced against the employee's employment. 22 Finally, in a
discrimination case against a large employer, there is likely to be a
statistical or comparative record of minority and non-minority
employment that will tend either to support or rebut a claim that
management is prejudiced.
Now consider a lawsuit claiming retaliation against a citizen
employee. In comparison with the practical limits for claiming
protected traits like minority race, the limits for claiming citizen
employee conduct are fewer. In the modem regulatory era, it is
relatively easy to find at least one possible violation-large or
small-of a business, safety, employment, environmental, or
financial regulation in any workplace. A protected right to charge
or resist "ethical" violations would certainly expand the
possibilities for an employee determined to assert the public
interest. Moreover, sincerity is not required to report or resist
wrongful conduct or to insist on the performance of a civic duty.
An employee who once condoned or even aided an employer's
wrongdoing might be tempted to report or resist such action at a
strategic moment to make impending disciplinary action suspect,
even if the disciplinary action was in fact inevitable and for
legitimate reasons. 26 If the employee has already suffered adverse
action, he might recall, perhaps with some exaggeration, at least
one complaint or other incident of protected conduct that might
plausibly motivate retaliation.
224. See Taken v. Okl. Corp. Comm., 125 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997)
(imposing higher prima facie threshold for reverse discrimination claimant).
225. See Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 1997)
(describing the so-called "same actor" rule of discrimination law).
226. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 362 (I11. 1978) (Underwood,
dissenting) ("Henceforth, no matter how indolent, insubordinate or obnoxious an
employee may be,... [the] employer may thereafter discharge him only at the
risk of being compelled to defend a suit for retaliatory discharge and unlimited
punitive damages."). See also Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 53, at
1156; Hubbell, supra note 46, at 101.
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In comparison with a false claim of discrimination, a false
claim of retaliation could be especially difficult for an investigator
or fact-finder to scrutinize or for an employer to rebut without an
expensive and potentially very complex trial on the merits. The
difficulty stems first from the nearly universal human urge to
retaliate or act "adversely" to persons who attack our integrity,
honesty, or competence. Again, consider a discrimination case for
purposes of comparison. A typical discrimination claimant seeks to
prove bias that makes no sense from a purely business standpoint.
Real discrimination is nearly always bad business because it results
in employee selection based on arbitrary criteria unrelated to
performance. Thus, a discrimination claimant must prove an
irrational bias that is not universal among managers.
"Subconscious" bias that might be nearly universal is particularly
difficult to present as a case, but it is the plaintiffs burden to
produce evidence of such bias and to prove its effect in his case.227
In contrast, a citizen employee or other retaliation claimant can
appeal to a fact-finder's expectation that the alleged conduct, e.g.,
accusing a manager of being a lawbreaker, would naturally
provoke most people. Moreover, a citizen employee's protected
conduct tends to yield its own evidence of retaliatory intent.
Explicitly or impliedly accused of wrongdoing, a manager might
naturally make a spontaneous and unguarded expression of
hostility, even if, or especially if, the employee's charge is
completely unfounded. If the claimant's protected conduct was
closely connected in time with adverse action, it may be
particularly difficult for an employer to overcome a fact-finder's
suspicion that the action was because of retaliatory intent. Finally,
statistical proof that might be very revealing and serve either party
in a discrimination case is generally impractical in citizen
employee cases because of the difficulty of identifying and
comparing sufficiently large and distinct classes of citizen
employees and "non-citizen" employees in the employer's
workforce.
The difficulty and cost of litigating citizen employee cases is
compounded by another potential expense. Citizen employees
typically allege not only that they suffered retaliation, but also that
the employer committed some separate wrong that required the
employee to act as a good citizen. Whether or not the underlying
allegation of that separate wrong led to any enforcement action by
regulatory authorities, a defendant employer must address the
allegation in the retaliation proceeding because of the allegation's
227. See Sheila Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent
Versus Impact, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1469 (2005).
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potential influence on the fact-finder's view of the merits of the
retaliation claim. An actual acquittal might help the defendant
employer for this purpose, but enforcement authorities might
simply fail to act, leaving the issue to be tried de novo in the
retaliation case. The allegation might involve a fairly complex
regulatory or financial matter. Moreover, putative citizen
employees sometimes allege multiple underlying wrongs, perhaps
with the hope that at least one will "stick." The defendant
employer will need to address each of the employee's charges in
the retaliation proceeding, both as to validity and as to causation.
Critics of retaliation laws have also argued that citizen
employee laws impose costs in the day-to-day management of the
business wholly aside from litigation expenses.228 According to
this argument, citizen employee laws undermine managerial
authority by empowering employees to question orders, delay
work, miss work, or show disreqpect to supervisors under the guise
of acting for the public interest. 9 Any law that protects employee
traits or conduct is subject to these objections, but critics find the
problem potentially more severe in the case of laws protecting the
conduct of citizen employees. 230 In the modem, highly regulated
workplace, a putative citizen employee has a myriad of
opportunities to rationalize or mischaracterize insubordinate or
disrespectful conduct. Moreover, the argument continues,
employees who feel empowered to question instructions or
business practices may do so with such frequency and persistence
that managers are forced to devote an increasing part of their time
to defending themselves from unfounded charges. 31




231. In a related vein, Professor Hubbell has argued that if anti-retaliation
laws protect whistleblowing based on general perceptions of public policy (such
as public safety), rather than specific laws or regulations, an employee might
saddle an employer with defense costs and wrongful discharge liability based on
rules not adopted by elected lawmakers and not preceded by advance notice to
the employer. Hubbell, supra note 46, at 112-13.
The same is true, however, when injured employees or consumers sue the
employer in tort for accidents caused by unsafe but not illegal practices or
conditions. Whistleblowing with respect to such conditions or products might
actually save an employer from loss, on balance, if the whistleblowing forces the
employer to take preventive measures. On the other hand, if whistleblowing is
without merit, the employer's costs are limited to its defense of and liability for
the wrongful discharge lawsuit, but only if the employer has taken adverse
action against the whistleblower.
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Empirical evidence to confirm or rebut the special costs and
burdens of citizen employee laws is scarce. Experience under
existing laws, however, does vield a few clues. New Jersey's
Conscientious Employee Act232 is one important source of
experience. The New Jersey Act is as broad as any in existence-it
has no particular employer or employee exclusions from coverage.
Looking only at decisions reported in the annotations under the
New Jersey Act, the Act does appear to have lead to considerable
litigation between employers and employees. The annotations
include approximately fifty-two appellate cases dated from the
beginning of 2000 through the end of 2008 alone.233 At first glance
this might seem to be a significant amount of litigation for a single
state, especially because appellate decisions are only the tip of the
iceberg.
A more telling set of numbers, however, are reported cases
involving an issue under the Conscientious Employee Act versus
reported cases including an issue under federal or state
discrimination law. A comparison of this sort puts citizen
employee cases in perspective. During the period beginning in
2000 through the end of 2008, there were approximately 350
reported decisions in federal and state courts of New Jersey that
appear to have involved some issue under the Conscientious
Employee Act.234  During the same period, there were
approximately 2,690 reported decisions by the same courts
involving some issue under discrimination law. 235 In other words,
the number of citizen employee cases was only a bit more than
one-eighth the number of discrimination cases. To put these
numbers in further perspective, discrimination cases are filtered by
an administrative process that resolves cases before litigation and
discourages the further litigation of non-meritorious cases. In
contrast, New Jersey's Conscientious Employee Act lacks a
filtering administrative process.
232. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
233. See annotations following N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2008).
234. This number is based on a March 2, 2009, search of the Westlaw
database for decisions of state and federal courts of New Jersey using the term
"Conscientious Employee Act."
235. This number is based on a March 2, 2009, search of the Westlaw
database for decisions of state and federal courts of New Jersey using any of a
series of terms including "Title VII," "Age Discrimination in Employment Act,"
or "Americans with Disabilities Act." The actual number might be higher
because some decisions might have referred only to a provision of state law
against discrimination.
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Additional experience comes from enforcement of a series of
federal whistleblower statutes administered by the Department of
Labor. During fiscal year 2007, employees throughout the nation
filed about 1,800 complaints under thirteen different federal
whistleblower statutes. While this might seem a considerable
number, a comparison with employee complaints of discrimination
puts the number in perspective. During fiscal year 2007, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received a total of
82,792 employee charges under Title VII, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.237 In
other words, the number of private sector federal whistleblower
charges was only about two percent of the number of EEOC
discrimination charges.
Admittedly, these statistics do not reveal the comparative cost
per case for employers responding to these claims. Defense of
citizen employee claims might still be more expensive per case
than discrimination claims. Moreover, enactment of a more
expansive citizen employee law would almost certainly increase
the number of claims by citizen employees. However, a substantial
improvement in coverage is unlikely to result in an unreasonably
burdensome increase in the number of individual claims. Most
major employers are already covered by federal or state citizen
employee laws with respect to one or more policies, functions, or
occupations. Industrial employers, for example, are covered by
environmental regulations with whistleblower provisions, financial
employers are covered by financial regulations with whistleblower
provisions, and transportation employers are covered by
transportation regulations with whistleblower provisions.2
38
Moreover, all employers are covered by employment laws with
limited whistleblower provisions. 23 9 While many existing laws
prohibit only "discharge" or tangible employment actions, some
laws already proscribe threats, harassment, or employer
interference.2 0 Thus, while existing coverage may be inadequate
236. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
PROGRAM: BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT WOULD HELP INSURE
PROGRAM QUALITY AND CONSISTENCY, 4, 24 (2009), available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d09106.pdf.
237. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics FY
1997 Through FY 2007, www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2008).
238. See CARLSON'S FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 4, at 656-736.
239. All employers are covered by the Occupational Safety and Health Act at
a minimum. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006).
240. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006) (the SOX anti-retaliation
provision); 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a) (2006) (prohibiting intimidation or coercion of
employees called to federal jury duty).
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for many legitimate but unlucky citizen employees with
meritorious claims, widely feared opportunistic "false" citizen
employees are already well armed with a broad range of potential
complaints. The horse is long out of the barn.
Whatever the increased burden for employers, the question of
whether expanded or more rational coverage is justified depends
on a comparison with the benefit to the public. Meritorious claims
are almost certainly worth the cost because they reveal or prevent
unlawful behavior or promote conduct valuable to the public.
However, an important implication of cost-based objections is that
many or most complaints by employees are meritless and do not
serve any public interest. Evidence with respect to the number of
meritless claims is mixed. Some early studies predating much of
our current citizen employee law suggest that whistleblowers
usually present real and substantial complaints about their
employers' behavior.24 1 Experience under modem whistleblower
laws with administrative enforcement suggests that many
employee claims are in fact ill-founded. Only about twenty-one
percent of complaints filed by whistleblowers with Department of
Labor were deemed by the Department to be meritorious or were
otherwise resolved favorably to the employee. 242 However, there are
many reasons an employee's claim might be dismissed. The claim
might be outside the coverage of a narrow whistleblower law, the
claim might be untimely, or the administrative investigator might
lack the resources or competence to understand the complexity of
the employee's charges against the employer. 243 Many claims
presently deemed to be without merit today might be meritorious
under expanded and more rationale coverage and enforcement.
In any event, the public still derives some value from claims
that lack merit and from claims never filed at all. Even a petty or
frivolous claim has the benefit of reminding the employer and all
its employees of the possibility that a single employee-perhaps
one with nothing left to lose-will expose wrongdoing. Awareness
of the rights of citizen employees might make employers better
citizens. If so, the real benefit of citizen employee laws will always
be difficult to measure because effective law will promote law-
abiding behavior and reduce the number of meritorious employee
claims.
241. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 53, at 1158.
242. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM, supra note 238, at 4.
243. See generally Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 18;
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM, supra note 238, at 32-40. For one
court's particularly disappointing view of the administrative process now known
as the Department of Labor's Whistleblower Protection Program, see Flenker v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 967 P.2d 295 (Kan. 1998).
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While the benefits of citizen employee laws are shared widely
by the public as a whole, it is unfortunately true that burdens might
be suffered unevenly by employers. The same is true of any
employment law. A perfectly law-abiding employer might be
saddled with a disproportionate and possibly lethal number of
opportunistic employees, while an incorrigible lawbreaker might
escape any consequences at all. The traditional solution to the
problem of uneven burdens in employment law has been a small
firm exemption144 to relieve very small employers of the possibly
disproportionate burdens of litigation and government regulation.
Many existing citizen employee laws lack such an exemption.
Greatly expanded coverage and protection might make such an
exemption necessary.
Also, citizen employee law could be better tamed even as
coverage is expanded, especially if courts are granted a sufficient
mandate to develop the details of the law and to require
"reasonable" behavior by putative citizen employees. Would-be
citizen employees should be encouraged to interact fairly and
responsibly with management in dealing with discovered
wrongdoing, preventing wrongdoing, avoiding illegal orders, or
taking time from work to serve as witnesses, voters, jurors, or
emergency responders. Federal courts have taken this approach
within their mandate to develop discrimination law under Title VII
and the Americans with Disabilities Act. For example, employees
needing "accommodation" of their religious practices or
disabilities are required to participate with their employers in an
interactive process in search of an appropriate accommodation.
245
A similar set of rules and expectations might reduce the costs of
protecting citizen employees. Courts working on a case-by-case
basis are probably in a better position than legislators to develop
the details of such rules.
The risks to employers can also be reduced by offering limited
defenses or ceilings on liability in return for positive employer
practices that encourage good citizenship and prevent retaliation.
Again, Title VII's wide judicial mandate to develop discrimination
law presents a useful example. Under Koltstad v. American Dental
Association, an employer's good faith efforts to prevent
discrimination can avert liability for punitive damages in a
244. See Richard Carlson, The Small Firm Exemption and the Single
Employer Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
1197 (2006).




discrimination lawsuit.246 In a case of discrimination by sexual
harassment, an employer can avoid significant liability by proving
its reasonable efforts to prevent and remedy harassment or by
proving the employee's failure to act reasonably in relying on the
employer's internal processes to seek a remedy. 47 Similar ideas for
whistleblowers and their employers are embedded in the "structural"
model of SOX. 248 A central law for citizen employees could
encourage the extension of such principles by a process of case-by-
case adjudication within a single federal and state common law.
Finally, in an ideal world, lawmakers would provide for
administrative investigation and enforcement similar to that of
Title VII or SOX. An administrative procedure can mediate
disputes at a comparatively low cost, and it can filter out many
undeserving claims that might otherwise reach the courts at great
expense to both parties. An administrative procedure might be
essential for investigation and remedying of lesser discrimination
and interference claims, which are frequently better addressed by
administrative negotiation and mediation than by court action.
Unfortunately, the effectiveness and usefulness of an
administrative process depends on its resources, and a badly
designed or poorly funded administrative process can actually
impede enforcement of the law.
2 4 9
2. Intra-Firm Communication
Another set of concerns sometimes raised by critics of citizen
employee laws relates to the effects of such laws on
communication within a firm or agency. First, critics worry
whistleblowers in particular might disclose confidential business
information in support of their whistleblowing claims, and
employers will be pressed to respond by inhibiting information
transfer within the corporation.
250
This argument would have little merit if it related only to an
employer's interest in preserving the confidentiality of
wrongdoing. The real concern, however, appears to be that in the
246. 27 U.S. 526 (1999).
247. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Elerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
248. See supra p. 44.
249. The existing whistleblower protection program administered by the
Department of Labor has received generally poor reviews, mainly because of its
lack of resources. See WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM, supra note 238
and Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 18.
250. See Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester, Inc., 421 N.E.2d 876, 884-85 (Ill.
1981) (Ryan, dissenting); Ribstein, supra note 63, at 286. See also Moberly,
Structural Model, supra note 53, at 1157, describing these arguments.
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course of attempting to reveal or prove wrongdoing, a
whistleblower might reveal trade secrets that have real or imagined
relevance to the employee's allegation. The employee's initial report
of wrongdoing might disclose little in this regard. If properly
directed he would divulge such information only to appropriate and
responsible authorities-not to the public or to competitors. A duty
to protect confidential information is exactly the sort of principle
that courts would be well prepared to develop if the law granted a
mandate for a common law for citizen employees.
A possibly greater danger is that the employer as well as the
employee may be compelled to reveal relevant but confidential
information or simply embarrassing information in order to litigate
whether the activity the employee reported was in fact unlawful.
Other wrongful discharge cases can present similar risks. Defending
wrongful discharge cases of any type can be embarrassing if
management acted lawfully but unprofessionally. Any type of
employment case can involve confidential personnel, customer, or
business data. Citizen employee cases might present these
difficulties with greater regularity and severity because employee
allegations of wrongdoing in financial practices, industrial
processes, or customer relations necessarily require an accounting
and investigation of sensitive information. Nevertheless, courts are
adept at issuing protective orders to preserve the confidentiality of
employer trade secrets and sensitive or legitimately private
information, and there is no reason to believe they have failed or
will fail to meet the challenge in citizen employee proceedings.
Moreover, private arbitration of disputes is another way of
preventing public disclosure of embarrassing facts, and the courts
have generally upheld the enforceability of arbitration agreements
with respect to citizen employee claims.
Another complaint is that overprotective whistleblower law will
inhibit frank and constructive discussion within an enterprise.252 It is
a premise of this argument, and almost certainly true, that managers
frequently discuss possible business strategies without knowing
what the law permits and what it prohibits. Critics fear that
managers will not speak openly of business plans among a wide
circle of associates if they fear seeming or being interpreted to
propose actions that might violate the law. 53 As a result, the risk of
251. See, e.g., Guyden v. Aenta, Inc., 544 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2008).
252. Romero v. UHS Westwood Pembroke, Inc., 893 N.E.2d 355, 359-60
(2008); Ribstein, supra note 63, at 286.
253. See supra note 255.
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liability under whistleblower laws might tend to postpone full
discussion of plans until legal implications are fully resolved.254
The solution to this problem is simply to avoid the "external"
model of whistleblowing found in many of the oldest statutes,
which protects employees if they report to outside authorities but
denies protection if they discuss their concerns with management
first. Employees should generally be encouraged to deal directly
with management where possible, to ask questions, and to
articulate concerns. Again, the right description and rules of
reasonable behavior for citizen employees and their employers in a
variety of scenarios are best left to courts in case-by-case
adjudication. In this regard, a well-developed citizen employee law
could greatly reduce the chilling effect of some current law.
C. Challenges in Writing the Law
A separate reason why courts and legislatures have stopped
short of creating a coherent body of law is that writing rules to
protect citizen employees is fraught with special challenges. If a
citizen employee chooses to uphold public policy at the
inconvenience of his employer, what actions by him deserve
protection? Is all behavior to be protected simply because it is
intended to support public policy? "Public policy" is not a clear
concept lending to easy consensus. For what purposes might an
employee be entitled to engage in acts that could otherwise be
regarded as insubordinate, disloyal, or petty troublemaking? In
answering these questions, courts and lawmakers must steer
between a goal of clarity and the practical necessity of being
somewhat vague. The advantage of a very specifically written rule
is that the parties will know exactly what is expected, what is
allowed, and what is prohibited. Unfortunately, a rule that is very
exact is unlikely to be adequate for every situation. The solution is
for lawmakers to provide broadly stated mandates for courts to
develop a more detailed common law on a case-by-case basis.
1. Employee Conduct
Citizen employees are defined by their conduct, so describing
their conduct is essential to any law for their protection. Even well-
intentioned conduct might be unnecessarily destructive of an
employer's business interests without accomplishing much for the
public. However, describing the right conduct for every situation
254. Id.
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and with due regard for employer and true public interests has
proved to be a major challenge for lawmakers.
In defining conduct, courts and legislators have been tempted
by the goals of specificity, clarity, and certainty. At first glance, it
might seem that specificity is within reach. Conduct-based anti-
retaliation laws bear a strong resemblance to discrimination laws,
and it might seem that defining protected conduct is more or less
like defining a specific protected trait or status. The resemblance is
deceiving. In a race, sex, or age discrimination case, there is
seldom any real difficulty in determining whether a person is a
member of the protected class.255 Protected traits like race or
gender are specific and indisputable in the vast majority of cases.
Conduct, on the other hand, cannot properly be treated as a discrete
and specific motor action. It usually consists of a series of acts and
events that have significance only with regard to context, intent,
and proportionality.
Conduct that has the effect of upholding policy can also spring
from a variety of motives or purposes, including bad faith or
malice, and even good faith intentions matched with a poor choice
of action can be needlessly harmful to the employer's business.
Problems of context, motive, and reasonableness are common grist
for protected conduct laws, includinfthose that protect "concerted
action" for collective bargaining, seeking certain employee
rights or benefits,257 or practicing religion.25 However, the
challenge is acute for lawmakers seeking to provide a specific
definition for the conduct of citizen employees.
One can define protected conduct broadly or narrowly. A broad
definition enables the widest range of conduct in the greatest range
of contexts and leaves employees with maximum discretion in
choosing their methods of action. The earliest protected conduct
laws were highly specific citizen employee laws, protecting the
conduct of voting.259 At the other end of the spectrum, Section 7 of
the NLRA is an example of the broad approach. Section 7
guarantees a number of rights with respect to collective bargaining,
255. Admittedly, there can be a difficult issue of whether an individual has a
trait necessary to be a member of a protected class, particularly in cases under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006) (defining
"disability"). See also Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (some
conditions may or may not be disabilities, depending on the circumstances of each
case). However, the ADA is exceptional among discrimination statutes in the
difficulties it poses with respect to its definition of protected status.
256. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
257. Id. § 1140.
258. Id. § 2000e(j).
259. See supra p. 23.
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including a catch-all right "to engage in other concerted activities
for ... other mutual aid or protection." 260 The unusual breadth of
Section 7 serves the purpose of the NLRA, which is to promote
collective bargaining and to strengthen the bargaining power of
employees rather than to establish particular terms of
employment.26' If employees choose to engage in concerted
activity it is up to them to determine their bargaining goals and,
within certain bounds, their pressure tactics. They are entitled to
make unreasonable262 demands and to take some disruptive
actions, even to the point of harming their employer's business
(such as by striking or picketing), provided the, act lawfully 263 and
for the purpose of "mutual aid or protection."
The breadth of protection granted by Section 7 is exceptional
among statutes protecting conduct. Congress might have thought
that the broad approach to protecting employee conduct under the
NLRA would be practical because most disputes would be
resolved in an administrative process designed to guide the parties
to productive "good faith" bargaining without massive liability.2 65
In contrast, a law allowing employees wide discretion to choose
methods of action, to hurt the employer's business, or to be
"unreasonable" in their demands would not be a useful approach
for other forms of protected conduct, such as upholding public
policy. In contrast with labor unions, citizen employees are not
bargaining. They are typically acting for the public's interest and
in support of a particular law or policy. Within the circumstances
of any particular case, the range of appropriate action will likely be
limited, such as by questioning, reporting, performing a civic
service, or refusing to commit an illegal act. Striking, picketing, or
holding a press conference will likely be much more destructive
than is necessary or appropriate. Moreover, in most instances it is
reasonable to require that a citizen employee must eventually defer
to independent public law enforcement authorities to decide
whether there has been an actual or potential violation of the law
and what should be done about it. The end result is not subject to
bargaining between the parties.
260. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
261. Id. § 151.
262. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15 (1962).
263. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.
1990) (denying protection for employees who secretly removed employer's
records).
264. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
265. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159-161 (2006). Admittedly, seventy years after the
enactment of the NLRA, neither management nor labor would likely agree that
the system has been "practical."
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A more widely used model for modem citizen employee law
has been the typical anti-retaliation provision in an employee rights
statute, such as Section 15 of the FLSA.266 Anti-retaliation
provisions like Section 15 actually serve as citizen employee laws
in some situations because they empower employees to enforce
their employers' legal duties. The employee who needs protection
against retaliation is usually an employee asserting his own right in
his own interest, but he might also be an employee-perhaps even
a supervisor or manager-reporting the employer's violation of the
rights of others.
In contrast with Section 7 of the NLRA, anti-retaliation
provisions like Section 15 of the FLSA protect a limited range of
conduct necessary to enjoy rights under a particular statute or to
assure effective enforcement of the statute. They protect mainly, if
not exclusively, acts of communication, such as filing claims and
reporting or providing information concerning possible violations
of the law. Section 15 protects an employee who has "filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding
under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to
testify in any such proceeding."' 26 7 Section 15 does not protect
employees seeking to uphold other laws, and it does not protect the
full range of employee conduct that might uphold the FLSA.268
The traditional whistleblower model represented by Section 15,
designed as a complement to protection for claimants, is prone to
explicit and implicit limitations. First, standing alone, a rule
explicitly protecting communicative actions such as claiming or
whistleblowing is not wide enough. Claimants file, complain, or
report, but citizen employees can support the law in other ways.
They can investigate, ask questions, refuse to violate the law, or
take action to assure compliance with the law. The traditional
claimant or whistleblower model represented by Section 15 does
not serve these citizen employees.
Section 15 is also a deficient model because of a tendency of
lawmakers and judges to lump claimants and whistleblowers
together when protection is simply part of an employee rights
266. Id. § 215.
267. Id. (emphasis added).
268. Section 15 protects only employee action with respect to violations of
"this chapter" (the FLSA). 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). It protects an employee
who files a "complaint," which some courts have interpreted to mean a formal
written complaint to the government. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009) (complaint must be in
writing); Meredith-Clinevell v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice ex rel. Virginia, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 951 (W.D. Va. 2004) (no protection for "internal" whistleblower
whose complaint was to his own employer).
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statute. Claimants and whistleblowers resemble each other in this
context because both groups enforce the law. Thus, lawmakers and
judges are inclined to apply the same set of rules to claimants and
whistleblowers in a law like Section 15. However, there is at least
one important difference between claimants and whistleblowers,
and the courts' failure to observe this difference has had important
implications for whistleblowers and other citizen employees.
Claimants are adversarial to their employers because their claims
demand expensive remedial action for the personal benefit of the
claimant. Citizen employees, on the other hand, are not acting for
their own personal benefit and are not necessarily adversarial to
their employers. Citizen employees might be acting to save their
employer from criminal or civil liability. However, a widespread
habit of seeing both claimants and citizen employees as necessarily
adversarial has led to the unnecessary denial of protection to some
particularly important classes of citizen employees.
One important type of citizen employee frequently denied
protection under the Section 15 model is the "internal"
whistleblower who takes his concerns to inside management.
269
Arguably, the internal whistleblower is behaving exactly as the law
should encourage him to do. His conduct yields the best
accommodation of employer and public interests, provided it
yields the right response from the employer. The internal
whistleblower might be saving his employer and the government
from costly litigation that would result if the employer were
cornered by an unexpected formal complaint. The explicit limits of
whistleblower provisions like Section 15 deny protection to the
internal whistleblower because he has not "filed" a complaint,
"instituted" a proceeding, or "testified" in a proceeding.270
The persistent failure of Congress, state legislatures, and courts
to cure this gap in many whistleblower laws raises the question
whether there is a good reason why internal whistleblowers are less
worthy of protection than external whistleblowers. One possible
explanation begins with the fact that judges and legislators regard
the internal whistleblower as essentially non-adversarial. If so, this
view confuses citizen employees with claimants. As noted above, a
citizen employee is not claiming benefits at the expense of his
269. See, e.g., Meredith-Clinevell, 344 F. Supp. 2d 951.
270. Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993). A number of
courts have found implicit protection for internal whistleblowers and claimants
under Section 15. See Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617, 625-26
(5th Cir. 2008). But see Caci v. Wiz of Lake Grove, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 297
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal complaint unprotected); Bell-Holcombe v. Ki, LLC,
582 F. Supp. 2d 761 (E.D. Va. 2008).
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employer. He might be seeking to guide his employer toward
compliance with the law.
If the employer or its managers put their own personal and
short-term interests first, the internal whistleblower may need
protection just as much as the employee who files a formal charge
at the first sign of a problem. However, courts and lawmakers
denying protection for an internal whistleblower seem to assume it
is unlikely that an employer would retaliate against an employee
who is not threatening the employer or who is seeking to serve the
employer's interests. This assumption confuses an employer's
interests with those of individual managers who might be threatened
by the citizen employee's efforts. Whatever the employer's long-
term interests, employment decisions are often based on short-term
personal interests of managers. Moreover, even the employer's
owners or highest management might decide that violating the law
or hiding a past violation is in the employer's best interests.
Still another possible argument for excluding non-adversarial,
internal whistleblowers is that it is too easy for "false"
whistleblowers to allege informal and internal complaints that
never really happened simply to invent a prima facie case of
retaliation. When an internal whistleblower alleges an oral report
to a supervisor but the supervisor disputes the allegation, the fact-
finder will need to choose between one party's self-serving
testimony and the other party's self-serving testimony. Limiting
protection to external whistleblowers means that there will
ordinarily be an objective record of a report to an independent
authority. However, a total bar against internal whistleblowers
goes too far. In some internal whistleblowing cases there might be
tangible and credible evidence of the employee's report, but a rule
excluding all internal whistleblowers from protection makes no
distinction between claims that are credible and those that are not.
More importantly, denying protection for internal whistleblowers
means that a prospective whistleblower is best advised to charge
first and ask questions later. The law forces him to act in the
manner most destructive to the employer's interests by denying a
well-intentioned employer the opportunity to correct a problem
before it is cornered by a costly and adversarial investigation by
the government.
Not surprisingly, the usual approach in the most recent
whistleblower laws is to extend protection to internal
whistleblowers. The Draft Restatement is representative of the
modem approach. Not only does it protect internal whistleblowers,
it suggests greater sympathy for the internal whistleblower than for
the external whistleblower. Comment e for Section 4.02 states:
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Often, the employee should first report concerns to
appropriate persons in the employer's system for reporting
claims . . . before communicating them to government
authorities .... This requirement furthers the employer's
legitimate interest in having an opportunity to remedy the
conduct or ameliorate its harm, as well as the public
interest in minimizing harm.
27 1
The failure to distinguish citizen employees from claimants
might explain another category of citizen employee sometimes
denied protection under the Section 15 model: the employee who
reports a violation "in furtherance of his job responsibilities. 272
The exception for conduct "in furtherance of' the job appears to
have its origin principally in whistleblower provisions like Section
15 that are attached to laws granting other rights to employees
against their employers.273 Section 15 does not expressly state that
action "in furtherance of' an employee's job is excluded from
coverage. 274 Nevertheless, courts sometimes find the exclusion to
be implicit. These courts have held that a whistleblower is
protected unless he stepped outside his normal job function or
otherwise presented himself as an adversary to the employer.
275
Claimants are always adversaries, so they are unaffected by the
rule. To appreciate the full significance of the exclusion for
conduct "in furtherance of' an employee's job, imagine how it
might apply under a non-employment law, such as an
environmental regulation with an anti-retaliation provision. An
employee whose job is to report toxicity levels in a stream by the
employer's factory would not be protected if the alleged cause of
his discharge was nothing more than his usual presentation of an
unfortunately damaging report.
The idea for a "furtherance of job responsibilities" exception
appears to have gained traction for more general application from
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.276 In
Garcetti the Court held that a public employee does not enjoy First
Amendment protection with respect to speech "pursuant" to
271. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 171, §
4.01 cmt. e.
272. Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd., 257 F. Supp. 2d 498
(D.P.R. 2003), reversed in part on other grounds, 375 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2004).
See also Hagan, 529 F.3d at 627-28; McKenzie v. Renberg's Inc., 94 F.3d 1478
(I0th Cir. 1996).
273. See cases cited supra note 268.
274. The author is unaware of any whistleblower or other citizen employee
law that expressly states the exclusion.
275. See sources cited supra note 275.
276. 547 U.S. 410 (2008).
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employment duties. 277  In a passage reminiscent of the
whistleblower debate, the Court stated that granting First
Amendment protection to speech "pursuant" to job duties "would
commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive
role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and
among government employees and their superiors in the course of
official business." 278 Subsequently, some lower courts have
suggested that Garcetti might support the denial of whistleblower
protection for any employee reports "in furtherance of' or
"pursuant to" job duties. 2 9
Garcetti is better read as discouraging such an exception in
whistleblower or other citizen employee laws. The First
Amendment rights at stake in Garcetti involved the right to express
opinions about the best way to manage the public's business, not a
right to report violations of the law. Assuming that a right to
express provocative opinions about business or agency strategy is
too intrusive to day-to-day management of a workplace, a right to
engage in citizen employee behavior is an entirely different matter.
Employees do not qualify as citizen employees by virtue of a
debate, argument, or opinion. They act to uphold the law. While
public employees enjoy First Amendment rights only to the extent
they speak as citizens, 280 citizen employees gain protection by
upholding the law in the performance of work. The Court was
clearly aware of these distinctions and of the importance of
whistleblowing in protecting public interests. In fact, the Court
referred to a network of "whistle-blower protection laws" and
"labor codes" (perhaps the Court meant civil service laws) as a
more suitable way to protect public interests.281
Whether Garcetti points one way or the other in the matter,
many courts began to deny protection for citizen employees acting
"in furtherance" of their jobs long before Garcetti. Thus, it is
important to determine whether there is any good reason for the
exception in anti-retaliation laws like Section 15 or any other
277. Id. at 421.
278. Id. at 423.
279. See, e.g., Lumsden v. Foster Farms, LLC, No. C07-5099RJB, 2008 WL
496137 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 21, 2008) (Connecticut public policy wrongful
discharge law); Cook v. CTC Commc'ns Corp., No. 06-cv-58-JD, 2007 WL
3284337 (D.N.H. Oct. 30, 2007) (USERRA anti-retaliation provision);
Schumann v. Dianon Sys., Inc., No. CV055000757S, 2007 WL 2938615 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 2007) (noting issue among Connecticut courts whether
Garcetti applies to private sector whistleblowers).
280. The Court reasoned that employees speaking or writing pursuant to their
job duties are unprotected by the First Amendment because they are
communicating as employees, not as citizens. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
281. Id. at 425.
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citizen employee law. One possible explanation is that adversarial
action, or action outside the normal routine of the job, makes an
allegation of retaliation more credible. Again, it is a mistake to
equate all citizen employee conduct with adversarial action. Recall
the employee whose job is to test the water for toxicity, who
performs the job much better than a predecessor did, and who
discovers contamination the predecessor conveniently missed. At
first glance, it might seem the employee has done nothing more than
to perform his job. However, there are times when an employee is
serving both the employer's interests and the public's interests. Any
employee whose job includes assuring compliance with the law
necessarily serves both public and employer interests. His right to
protection should not depend on his anticipation that his employer
might regard him as an adversary for doing his job too well.
Critics of citizen employee laws argue in reply that quality
control inspectors and others whose judgment is needed to approve
work can do their work too well. If citizen employee protection is
extended to such employees when they perform their normal work,
critics add, any dispute over the quality, manner, or pace of the
work becomes a potential "retaliation" case. 2 82 A closely related
argument is that extending protection to the routine performance of
work makes it too easy for a lawfully discharged employee to
remember a routine task, report, or transmission of information
that is now alleged evidence of the employer's violation of the law.
An employee whose job involves inspecting other work or
reporting errors is in an especially advantageous position because
he can nearly always recall at least one recent discovery of an error
or quality control problem he described to an employer.
Granting that conduct "in furtherance of job duty" presents
special problems of proof and credibility, a categorical exception
for such conduct is out of place in the context of most citizen
employee laws. As noted earlier, the exception appears to have its
origin in whistleblower provisions of laws granting other rights to
employees against their employers.283 In its original setting, the
exception makes plausible sense. When a law grants other
employment rights to employees, such as the right to a minimum
wage, one can generally count on employees to enforce the law
simply by demanding the benefits to which they are entitled. Anti-
retaliation protection for claimants is essential. Additional
282. The U.S. Supreme Court relied on a variation of this argument in
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2008). See also Lawrence Rosenthal,
The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM
L. REv. 33 (2008).
283. See supra note 266.
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protection for non-claimant whistleblowers is helpful. Protection
for managers or administrators in the performance of their jobs is
arguably dispensable except in those cases in which such
employees have taken an adversarial position.
In contrast, citizen employee laws designed to enforce
financial, environmental, or other non-employment regulations
achieve maximum effectiveness by assuring protection of
employees who are in the best position to observe, question,
understand, and report violations of the law. Not surprisingly,
federal courts interpreting the whistleblower provision of SOX
appear to have rejected the "furtherance of job duty" exception in
applying that law.284 If the goal is to prevent financial fraud, it
would make no sense to discourage the very employees best
equipped to discover and report such fraud. It is true that
employees who simultaneously serve the employer and the
public's interests will always be in a position to assert retaliation as
the cause of adverse action, and this may place them in a better
position than most employees to assert meritless retaliation claims.
However, instead of a categorical exclusion, the courts should deal
with this problem as a matter of proof, requiring, for example,
additional evidence of any sort that would explain an employer's
retaliatory motive. Such evidence might include the magnitude of
the employer's potential liability if wrongdoing were exposed.
In sum, neither NLRA Section 7 nor the FLSA Section 15
offers the right model for citizen employee law. Citizen employee
law must have reasonable limits in the conduct it protects, but it
also must be broad enough to provide coverage for a wide range of
conduct in a variety of contexts, including situations in which an
employee did not act as an adversary. To provide the sort of
protection the Court idealized in Garcetti, lawmakers should look
to the example of laws of broader coverage for conduct.
There are several such models from which to choose, 285
including the Draft Restatement's catch-all provision in Section
284. See, e.g., Fraser v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int'l., 417 F. Supp. 2d 310
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365
(N.D. Ga. 2004).
285. Title VII offers its "opposition" clause as an example. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) (2006). The opposition clause protects employees engaged in any act
"opposing" a violation of Title VII. See generally B. LINDEMANN & P.
GRossMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 655-63 (3rd ed. 1996).
However, as broad as the opposition clause might seem-and it is certainly
broader than most citizen employee laws-it is still not broad enough. It might not
protect employee conduct merely complying with the law to an employer's
subsequent consternation. Nor does it protect citizen employees whose conduct
consists of performing other types of public duty, such as by serving as witnesses.
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4.02.286 Section 4.02, having described specific types of conduct in
its subparts, adds its broadest protection in subpart (f) for
"engaging reasonably and in good faith in other activity directly
furthering a substantial public policy." The "substantial" policy
requirement recognizes that protection for some forms of activity
might depend on the nature or magnitude of the policy the
employee seeks to serve. Much more will be said about this
problem in the immediately following subpart of this article. The
requirement that an employee must act "reasonably" recognizes the
need to consider an employer's legitimate business interests. An
employee need only go so far in acting for the public interest
before his actions constitute a needless destruction of business
interests. It is one thing to question or report a manager's conduct
by communication with higher management or outside law
enforcement authorities. It is another to call a press conference.
What is "reasonable" will frequently depend on the nature of
the policy the employee seeks to uphold, and more will be said
about this topic in the immediately following subpart. What is
reasonable will also depend on what an employer offers for citizen
employees who wish to report or question business practices. An
employee's failure to use a hotline or other special channel for
questioning business practices or managerial misconduct could be
unreasonable if unexplained.
A more troubling issue is whether a citizen employee must act
in "good faith." To require good faith might suggest an employee's
motive must be truly civic or moral. From the perspective of the
public interest, however, it is questionable whether a citizen
employee's motive matters. If whistleblowing uncovers massive
financial fraud, should a court deny relief to the whistleblower if
the evidence shows he failed to act until he was angered by a
missed promotion? Citizen employee cases might often present
such problems of "reverse" mixed motive,287 where the mixture of
motives is the employee's problem, not the employer's problem.
Indeed, a putative citizen employee might act from purely selfish
or jealous motives, unmixed by any sense of civic duty.
The potentially selfish aspect of citizen employee behavior
should not be surprising, and it should not be condemned. After all,
in some situations federal law pays a bounty to selfish
286. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 171, § 4.02.
287. The watershed mixed motive case in employment law is Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2(m), 2000e-5(g)(B) (2006) (codifying a mixed motive rule for Title VII cases).
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whistleblowers for uncovering fraud against the government. 288
Paying a bounty works because it motivates whistleblowers
regardless of their sense of civic duty, even if their desire for gain
is mixed with the joy of revenge. This is not to say that the
"selfish" citizen employee should enjoy the same remedies as the
truly civic-minded citizen employee. A court might properly deny
punitive damages to the former and award them to the latter. If the
employee's own retaliatory intent motivated his conduct, the
reasons for his desire for retaliation might also affect the
calculation of damages. Thus, a requirement of "good faith" should
not relate to motive. Instead it should serve only as a requirement
that an employee must believe in good faith that the law requires or
prohibits something, or that there are sufficient grounds for further
investigation.
As the Draft Restatement suggests by its broad terms,
developing the details of such rules is best left to the courts and
case-by-case adjudication. The role of Congress and the
legislatures should be to grant the courts the necessary mandate.
2. Public Policy
Another challenge for lawmakers and courts is to define the
"public policy" a citizen employee might appropriately seek to
uphold. Courts and legislators have struggled over this challenge as
much as they have struggled over the issue of conduct. Certainly,
public policy must be something more than an employee's
personal policy or sense of right, no matter how strongly felt. It
must be a policy the "public" recognizes in some fashion. Ideally,
it should also be important enough to justify intervention in the
employer-employee relationship because enforcement of trivial
policies by anti-retaliation legislation might do more harm than
good. In a perfect world, citizen employee laws could state clearly
which publicly declared rules employees may uphold against their
employers. Both employers and employees would like to be certain
of their rights before they draw their respective lines in the sand.
But how does one describe in advance all important public policy
in a way that is both comprehensive and clear if the description is
288. One example is the False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006).
For a discussion of existing and proposed rewards for whistleblowers, see
Geoffrey C. Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-
Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91
(2007); Marsha Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The




also to be useful as a practical matter to managers, supervisors, and
employees acting in the real workplace?
A concept of "public policy" for purposes of citizen employee
law can be no clearer than the separate statutes, case law, or other
public expressions that declare policy, but much of our law is not
clear. In the case of a great deal of complex business, labor, and
environmental regulation, a statute can only be understood by
reference to a substantial body of regulations and case law, much
of which calls for case-by-case adjudication based on myriad
circumstances. Nor do statutes typically assign publicly determined
comparative weight to the different parts of the policies they
represent. A regulation requiring a particular procedure or
presentation of data does not necessarily distinguish the important
from the trivial, except perhaps in a statement of criminal or civil
penalties.
Many citizen employee laws seem to avoid these problems by a
"one policy and one anti-retaliation rule at a time" approach.
Legislators enact a regulation, such as a law requiring a certain
safety measure, and they decide whether that regulation needs the
support of an anti-retaliation provision. A general definition of
"policy" is unnecessary because the rule against retaliation applies
no farther than the regulation to which it is attached. Instead of one
citizen employee law, there are simply anti-retaliation provisos
attached to other particular laws. This approach has the superficial
appearance of specificity and a careful advance weighing of public
versus employer interests. In reality, it accomplishes neither of
these objectives. Again, the scope of anti-retaliation protection can
be no clearer than the statute declaring the underlying policy. If a
law prohibits "discrimination" and prohibits retaliation against
employees who "oppose" discrimination, does the law protect an
employee's vigorous opposition against his employer's affirmative
action plan?289 If a law prohibits "child abuse" and prohibits
retaliation against teachers and other employees who report
suspected child abuse, does the law prohibit retaliation against
teachers who report that a parent has spanked a child?
A more likely explanation for the statute-by-statute approach is
that it is easier to persuade legislators of the merits of citizen
289. See, e.g., Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 11 F.3d 352 (4th Cir.
2001) (plaintiff could reasonably believe that the affirmative action plan he
opposed was unlawful). Affirmative action favoring the selection of minorities
could be illegal "reverse discrimination." On the other hand, a law against
"discrimination" might actually require an employer to engage in affirmative
action, depending on the circumstances. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480
U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding validity of employer's preferences for hiring
females for certain positions, as part of voluntary affirmative action plan).
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employee laws when the debate focuses on a particular policy,
such as the prevention of child abuse. Opposition builds when
proponents suggest a rule of general application for citizen
employees because it is easier to sensationalize with examples of
trivial or frivolous rules or policies from any other comer of the
law. 290 Nevertheless, a few legislatures and a number of state
courts acting without legislative mandate have adopted broadly
inclusive citizen employee laws. These laws accept that absolute
certainty and clarity of policy are impossible; nevertheless, they
opt in favor of broad protection. Some differentiate between
policies that are "fundamental," "clearly mandated," or "well-
defined" from those that are not.9 It is doubtful whether requiring
such qualities in a policy adds much certainty.292 The chief
advantage is that standards such as these provide courts with
discretion to weigh respective public and employer interests and to
deny protection for employee action based on trivial or reasonably
disputable policy. To the extent a qualitative standard for "policy"
constitutes a clear mandate for courts to make distinctions case-by-
case, adding standards could be useful.
But there is also a risk of grave unfairness to citizen employees
in a law that requires them to prove the relative importance of the
law the employer sought to violate. The relative importance of
many rules depends on value judgments, technical knowledge, and
additional information about which an employee might have to
speculate. The problem is illustrated by Smith v. Heritage Salmon,
Inc. 2 9 3 In Smith, employees of a fish hatchery alleged they were
discharged for refusing to follow instructions that would have
violated environmental law.294 A Maine statute does protect
employees who refuse to obey instructions to violate the law, but
only if complying with the instructions would have caused serious
injury or death to an individual. 295 The court dismissed the
employees' claim. Although the employees might have proved the
290. One seldom needs to go far to find an example of a trivial statute or
regulation. A famous and regularly invoked example is a set of regulations once
adopted by the Occupational Health & Safety Act (OSHA) that prohibited the
use of ice in drinking water and that required that all toilets must be "open
front." See MARK ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMANN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 712-13
(2007).
291. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983);
Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992).
292. Cf Geary v. Telular Corp., 793 N.E.2d 128, 134 (2003), lamenting that
"[t]here is no precise definition of what constitutes a clearly mandated public
policy."
293. 180 F. Supp. 2d 208 (D. Me. 2002).
294. Id. at 212.
295. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 26, § 833 (2007 & Supp. 2008).
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employer's instructions would have endangered the health of the
local stream, they could not prove that damaging the stream would
cause death or serious injury to people. 296 Unfortunately, employees
who uphold the law cannot always know in advance what scientific
proof or specific harms are the bases for the law. Smith also
illustrates that when courts or legislatures seek to be specific about a
required degree of policy importance, the result is likely to be
severely restrictive coverage. Finally, it is important to remember
that many laws seem trivial because they prohibit a single act that is
significantly harmful only if it is repeated many times. Citizen
employees might still provide a valuable service by preventing the
first illegal act or the accumulation of further illegal acts.
As an alternative to requiring that policy must be "important"
or meet some standard of significance, some states distinguish
between policies enforced by criminal sanctions (employee action
protected) versus policies enforced by civil sanctions (employee
action unprotected).297 This approach wrongly assumes that a
legislature's specification of punishment in a law indicates the
relative importance of the underlying policy to the public. But a
legislature's choice of the right civil and criminal penalty is a
decision about deterrence-not protection or encouragement.
298
The right measure of punishment for deterrence depends on the
potential harm of misconduct to the public, the wrongdoer's
expected gain, the likelihood of non-detection, and the social and
economic cost of causing obsessive fear of overly-stringent
penalties.299 It is a separate, though admittedly related, question
whether compensation is appropriate to encourage citizen
employees. More importantly, granting citizen employee
protection increases the likelihood that certain wrongdoing will be
detected. It could serve as an alternative to the imposition of
higher criminal penalties or any criminal penalty at all. Thus, it is
not surprising that many anti-retaliation provisions accompany
purely civil laws-not criminal laws--or they offer employees the
same remedy regardless of whether the violation the employee
opposed would have been civil or criminal.
Still another approach followed by some states is to protect
citizen employees only with respect to policies adopted by
particular branches or levels of government. For example, one
296. The employees were nevertheless able to establish a prima facie case
under another provision of Maine law. Smith, 180 F. Supp. at 217-18.
297. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985);
Hawthorne v. Star Enter., Inc., No. 07-02-0458-CV, 2003 WL 21705370 (Tex.
App. July 23, 2003).
298. See Hubbell, supra note 46, at 106-97.
299. Id.
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might distinguish between laws enacted by the legislature and laws
declared by a court or regulatory agency. 00 The statute-by-statute
approach has the same effect by limiting anti-retaliation protection
to particular statutes enacted by Congress or a state legislature, but
some state courts and legislatures offer broad protection for citizen
employees whose actions uphold any statute, constitution, or other
policy of specified source and rank. California, for example,





One type of "law" that might be excluded by this approach is
court-declared law, particularly with respect to torts or contract
law. The case for exclusion is strongest with respect to the
common law of contracts, or rather duties created by contract. If an
employee opposes a breach of contract, such as by disobeying
instructions to interrupt a delivery of promised goods, the
employee is not necessarily upholding public policy. A breach of
contract is a breach of a duty created by the parties to the contract,
not by the state. The state's interest in the enforcement of contract
duties is simply that a promisee should receive the value of his
expectation interest (or in some cases, his reliance interest). For
this reason, courts frequently refer to the theory of "efficient
breach," according to which a breach of contract might be
beneficial to the public interest and is not harmful unless the
promisee remains uncompensated.30 2
But citizen employee laws that deny anti-retaliation protection
for policies expressed in the common law are not so nuanced. They
also deny protection to employees who oppose an employer's torts,
which are violations of duty imposed by law, as declared by the
courts. The effect of this exclusion is limited by widespread
codification that converts much of common law into statutory law,
but codification is frequently incomplete. A codification might
define some torts but not others. 30 3 Is the legislature's choice in
300. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501.3(c)(i) (Supp. 2008).
301. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009). Judicial
pronouncements, provided they have a "singularly public purpose." Wagenseller
v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
302. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir.
1985) (discussing how efficient breaches are socially beneficial since both
parties are either in the same or better position than they would have been if the
contract had been performed); TruGreen Co., L.L.C. v. Mower Bros., Inc., 199
P.3d 929 (Utah 2008). See also Fred McChesney, Tortious Interference with
Contract Versus "Efficient" Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131 (1999), which discusses the conflict between the efficient
breach theory and the "tort" of third-party interference.
303. The current Texas code, for example, defines libel but not slander. TEX.
Cry. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008).
[Vol. 70
CITIZEN EMPLOYEES
this instance a declaration that one tort violates public policy and
the other does not? Or is it simply the legislature's decision to
change or stabilize the common law in one area and to defer to the
courts in the other? A legislature might implicitly recognize a tort
by providing a statute of limitations or other limit on liability. Has
the tort become part of the statutory law in this instance? Thus,
limiting protection to citizen employees who act to uphold
legislative law does little to clarify the rights of employers and
employees. The cost is the loss of protection for employees who
resist torts that are universally recognized as wrong but not
necessarily codified. Employees instructed to commit or condone
fraud, invasion of privacy, defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, or negligent acts or omissions must obey on
pain of termination.
If the argument for specific or clearly defined public policy for
purposes of citizen employee law is unrealistic, the alternative is to
accept that "public policy" will have to do. This is the approach of
the courts and legislatures in a number of states and of the Draft
Restatement of Employment Law.30 4 The Draft Restatement
protects listed forms of employee opposition to a violation of the
"law., 30 5 This would seem to include any rule declared enforceable
by a public authority, including a court.
Under some circumstances, the Draft Restatement suggests that
public policy might include principles not declared as "law." In
particular, the Draft Restatement protects employees who report or
refuse to commit an act that would violate an "established principle
of professional conduct." 30 6 Such a principle need not be a "law."
It might be the private directive of a self-regulated professional
association. However, the Draft Restatement grants protection in
the case of a principle of professional conduct only if the principle
"protects the public interest."30 7 Thus, while such a principle might
not be a "law" and might not have been declared by any public
authority, a court may still treat the principle as a law (for purposes
of citizen employee law) if the court determines that the principle
protects the public's interest and not just the profession's interest.
Granting such protection is a valuable concession to members of
self-regulated professions who might otherwise be forced to choose
between conscience, civic duty, and risk of professional censure on
one hand and termination without compensation on the other.
304. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 171, § 4.02.
305. Id. § 4.02(a), (b), (e).
306. Id. § 4.02(a), (e).
307. Id.
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The Draft Restatement and a few state courts take protection
still one step further. From nearly the beginning of the "public
policy" exception, some courts have suggested that public policy
might be more than what is declared as "law" or in professional
codes of conduct. The Draft Restatement's catch-all provision
grants protection for some employee conduct "furthering a
substantial public policy, 30 8 which returns us to the question, what
is "public policy?" By distinguishing between employees who
uphold the "law" versus employees who serve a "substantial public
policy," the Draft Restatement implies that public policy might be
larger than the law.30 9 A few state courts have endorsed that view.
A Vermont court, for example, stated that public policy might be
found "in the customs and conventions of the people-in their
clear consciousness and conviction of what is naturally and
inherently just and right between man and man."310 Such an
approach might have been helpful to employees in a case like
Payne, where the employer prohibited any trade with the merchant
who competed with the employer's company store.
The non-law public policy approach would apply best when an
employee is placed in a particularly stark and immediate dilemma
of choosing between an extraordinary public interest versus a
much less substantial or worthy employer interest, but choosing the
employer interest would not violate a law. There are few reported
examples, but at least one is compelling. In Gardner v. Loomis
Armored, Inc., 3 11 an armored truck driver and guard left his truck
and $50,000 cash to rescue a hostage during an armed robbery.
The employer discharged the driver for violating a company rule
never to leave a truck unattended.3 12 Then the driver sued, seeking
compensation based on public policies of "encouraging citizens to
help law enforcement, . to render aid to those in need," and to
protect human life.313 Of course, there is no law that would have
compelled the driver to risk his own life and the employer's
property to save another person. Nevertheless, the court found that
the high value of human life and a public policy in favor of
308. Id. § 4.02(f).
309. But see id. § 4.03, stating that public policy "includes" constitutions,
statutes, decisional law, administrative regulations, and principles of professional
conduct.
310. Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (Vt. 1986). For similar
definitions of public policy, see Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d
876 (Ill. 1981); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975); Banaitis v. Mitsubishi
Bank, Ltd., 879 P.2d 1288 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
311. 913 P.2d377 (Wash. 1996).
312. Id. at 378-79.
313. Id. at 382-84.
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assistance to the police were evidenced by many statutes and court
decisions. 314 The court might have added that the public certainly
values human life at much more than $50,000 (the amount in the
unattended truck). The employer, having flexed its managerial
power to force an employee to prefer the employer's much less
valuable private interest, was properly required to pay
compensation, if not to the hostage then to the employee who
sacrificed his job to rescue the hostage.
The adoption of broad concepts of public policy will disturb
those who fear employee litigiousness more than employer
misconduct. However, once one accepts the merit of protecting
true citizen employees, there are no real solutions to the difficulty
of defining and weighing public policy in advance. Any approach
with reasonably inclusive coverage leads to nearly equal problems
of uncertainty. It is not surprising, therefore, that reported
retaliation cases under very broad citizen employee laws, such as
those of New Jersey or Arizona, are not clearly more numerous
than reported retaliation cases under comparatively narrow citizen
employee laws, such as the laws of Texas.
3 15
The best way to manage the indefiniteness of "public policy" is
to concentrate on the behavior of employees in asserting public
policy and on the manner of the employer's response. If a law is
obsolete or of minor significance, not all employee responses
qualify as "reasonable." Refusing to carry out an order might be
insubordinate if performance of the task does not pose a risk of
serious, immediate, or irreparable harm. However, an actual,
possible, or prospective violation of a minor or uncertain law can
warrant whistleblowing, questioning, or verbal objection. These
actions are not properly regarded as insubordinate. They need not
interrupt or present any other immediate threat to an employer's
ongoing business. Questioning or objecting may cause an
employer to think more carefully. Whistleblowing transfers the
final decision to outside law enforcement authorities and away
from the employee or the employer. If law enforcement authorities
fail to act, the employee should not be allowed to elevate himself
to the position of a judge in determining whether the employer has
or is breaking the law.
The employer's response can also be more important than the
relative weight or clarity of the policy. If the employer responds
314. Id.
315. Compare annotations under TEx, GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.002 (Vernon
2004 & Supp. 2009), one of many narrow Texas citizen employee laws, with
annotations under laws of more general coverage, such as N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:19-3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008) and ARIz. REv. STAT. § 23-1501 (Supp. 2008).
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harshly to questioning, objecting, or whistleblowing, it should
matter little whether the law in question was of minor or major
significance because the employer's response sends the same
message: citizen employee conduct is not tolerated. Under a citizen
employee law that prohibits employer "threats" or "interference,"
the employer's conduct will constitute grounds for at least an
administrative action even if the employer has taken no formal
disciplinary action against the employee and even if the employee
was reasonably mistaken about the existence or requirements of
the law.
In sum, an exact specification of public policy in citizen
employee law is neither possible nor desirable. What was true for
purposes of defining conduct is also true for purposes of defining
public policy: lawmakers should speak in general terms and
empower the courts to develop a common law that addresses the
details in light of real cases.
CONCLUSION
After more than a century of experiments and half-steps toward
protecting citizen employees, the time is ripe for a more
comprehensive and rational approach. In place of the scattered and
narrow statutes that now provide random protection for only some
citizen employees, lawmakers should provide a master law based on
general principles. Citizen employees should be treated under their
own law and not left to ride on enforcement provisions of laws
serving mainly other purposes.
Drafting a law for citizen employees begins with recognizing
them as a distinct class presenting unique characteristics and
challenges. The principle challenges lie in finding the right limits to
protected conduct and in identifying the policies a citizen employee
might support. To overcome these challenges, lawmakers should
abandon the effort to draft specific statutes and should authorize
courts to develop a new common law within general statutory limits.
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